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BROKER-DEALERS, INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS, AND
FIDUCIARY DUTY: MUCH ADO ABOUT NOTHING?
LYNN BAI*
ABSTRACT
Under the mandate of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer
Protection Act of 2010, the SEC is soliciting public opinions on whether
broker-dealers should be subject to a fiduciary duty when advising retail
and institutional investors. This Article focuses on the advisability of such
a proposal for institutional investors. It shows that, first, a fiduciary duty
could potentially enhance broker-dealers' standard of conduct for only a
subset of institutional investors who are well capitalized, capable of as-
sessing risks independently, and acknowledge in writing their non-
reliance on broker-dealers' advice. Thus, the benefit of fiduciary duty is
much narrower than what its proponents believe. Second, institutional
investors face substantial obstacles in recovering damages from broker-
dealers who violate their standard of conduct in private litigation, and yet
fiduciary duty would not help in this regard. In light of fiduciary duty's
negligible benefit but indeterminate cost to the financial industry, it is not
a viable measure for enhancing institutional investor protection.
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INTRODUCTION
The role of a financial-service professional can be broadly characterized
as an investment adviser, a broker, or a dealer. An investment adviser pro-
vides advice to investors on the advisability of investing in securities and
the securities' values.' A broker is a "person engaged in the business of
[executing trades] in securities for the account of others .... 2 A dealer is a
"person engaged in the business of buying and selling securities for his
own account," with or without the assistance of a broker.3
Many financial-service firms offer both investment advisory and broker-
dealer services. According to a recent study conducted by the Securities and
Exchange Commission, approximately eighty-eight percent of investment
advisers are also registered as broker-dealers. Among more than 5,000 reg-
istered broker-dealer firms, approximately twenty percent currently or have
future plans to offer investment-advisory services, with the expectation
that those services will constitute at least one percent of the firm's annual
revenue.5 Dual registration aside, the line between the conduct of investment
advisers and that of broker-dealers is also blurry, as the latter are often their
counterparties or provide advice when executing trades for investors.
Investment advisers and broker-dealers are subject to different sets of
regulations. Investments advisers are primarily regulated under the Invest-
ment Advisers Act of 1940, but are also subject to the anti-fraud provisions
of the Securities Act of 1933 (the Securities Act) and the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934 (the Exchange Act). They owe a fiduciary duty to their clients.8
Broker-dealers are also regulated under both the Securities Act and the Ex-
change Act, as well as rules promulgated by the Financial Industry Regula-
tory Authority (FINRA)-a self-regulatory organization for securities firms
doing business in the United States.9 Broker-dealers generally do not owe
a fiduciary duty to their clients under federal law, but some courts have
1 Investment Advisers Act of 1940 § 202(a)(1 1), 15 U.S.C.A. § 80b-2 (West 2013).
2 Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 3(a)(4)(A), 15 U.S.C.A. § 78c (West 2013).
3 Id. § 3(a)(5)(A).
' U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N, STUDY ON INVESTMENT ADVISERS AND BROKER-
DEALERS AS REQUIRED BY SECTION 913 OF THE DODD-FRANK WALL STREET REFORM AND
CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT iii (2011) [hereinafter SEC STUDY REPORT].
5 Id. at 8.
6 Id. at 100 (citing the results of a survey that shows thirty-four percent of retail inves-
tors that participated in the survey selected the primary function of a broker-dealer as "to
offer advice").
7 Id. at iii.
81d.
9 See generally id.
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imposed a fiduciary duty under limited circumstances when there is a special
trust relationship or when a broker-dealer exercises control over trading ac-
tivities of the client.10 This differentiated treatment has been cited as a core
difference between the regulation of investment advisers and broker-dealers."
The meltdown of the subprime mortgage and credit default swap markets
in the 2008 financial crisis triggered a deluge of lawsuits brought by institu-
tional investors (such as hedge funds, mutual funds, banks, and industrial
companies) against Wall Street securities firms.12 These lawsuits alleged that
the securities firms lured investors into the minefield of complex credit deriv-
atives by misrepresenting risks. 13 These lawsuits also highlighted concerns
for investor protection, eventually triggering a legislative inquiry into whether
a uniform fiduciary standard should apply to both broker-dealers and their
investment-adviser counterparts when serving in an advisory capacity re-
garding investments for clients.
Although the initial focus of this legislative inquiry was on providing bet-
ter protections to retail investors from the misconduct of broker-dealers, the
inquiry subsequently expanded into whether such a higher level of protec-
tion was also needed for institutional investors after the highly publicized
SEC complaint against Goldman Sachs.1 5 The SEC alleged that Goldman
Sachs, in arranging and marketing a security, failed to disclose a known
conflict of interest arising from the fact that an entity-unaffiliated with
Goldman Sachs had an active role in selecting the reference securities for
10 Id. at iv; see also Grant E. Buerstetta, Creating a Flexible Fiduciary Duty Rule for
Banks Entering into Proprietary Derivatives Contracts, 15 ANN. REV. BANKING L. 395,
408 (1996).
" SEC STUDY REPORT, supra note 4, at 106.
12 Janet R. Davis & Gary L. Gassman, Potential Insurance Coverage Implications
from the Financial Crisis, MECKLER BULGER TiLSON MARICK & PEARSON LLP 1, 1-2,
http://www.mbtlaw.com/pubs/dricovinfo.pdf.
13 For example, in the dispute between the Wisconsin School District and RBC Capital
Markets over $200 million worth of CDOs, the School District claimed that RBC misrep-
resented the default rate of the CDOs and misled it into investing in the product. See RBC
Capital Markets, LLC, Securities Act Release No. 9262, Exchange Act Release No. 65404,
Investment Advisers Act Release No. 3289 (Sept. 27, 2011) (institution of proceedings).
In the dispute between China Development Industrial Bank and Morgan Stanley, the
Chinese Bank alleged that Morgan Stanley, upon realizing that its proprietary subprime
mortgage positions were deteriorating in value, dumped the loss by arranging a credit swap
deal and collaborating with a credit rating agency to misrepresent the default risk. See
China Dev. Indus. Bank v. Morgan Stanley, 2011 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 1808, at *1 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 2011).
14 See Thomas J. Moloney, Paul R. St. Lawrence III & Angela F. Hamarich, Fiduciary
Duties, Broker-Dealers and Sophisticated Clients: A Mismatch that Could only Be Made
in Washington, 3 J. SEC. L., REG. & COMPLIANCE, no. 4, July 2010, at 338.
15 See id at 337-38; SEC v. Goldman Sachs & Co., 790 F. Supp. 2d 147 (S.D.N.Y. 2011).
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a pool of collateralized debt obligations (CDOs)-held positions that would
benefit from the decline in value of the reference securities.16 In a congres-
sional hearing over this case, the Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of
Goldman Sachs, Lloyd Blankfein, openly stated that Goldman Sachs was
merely acting as a market-maker in that deal and as such, it owed no fidu-
ciary duty to disclose the information to investors.1 7 Shortly after this hearing,
Senator Boxer (D-Cal.) proposed establishing a fiduciary duty for broker-
dealers in the types of relationships where the disparity in expertise between
broker-dealers and investors can be substantial, including a broker-dealer's
relationship with pension plans, with employee benefit plans, and with state
-18
or local governments in commodities and derivatives transactions. Senator
Spector (D-Pa.) proposed a bill to not only impose a fiduciary duty but also
to criminalize willful violations of such a standard. 19
Not everyone favors a uniform fiduciary standard, however: opponents
have pointed to the higher sophistication level of institutional investors
relative to retail investors, institutional investors' expectation of arms-length
transactions with broker-dealers, and the difficulty in defining the scope of
fiduciary duties in light of the multiple facets of a broker-dealer's relation-
ship with institutional investors (for example, trade executor, counterparty,
market-maker, and advisor).20
Although Senator Spector's and Senator Boxer's proposals are not in-
cluded in the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection
Act of 2010 (Dodd-Frank), the issue remains alive under Dodd-Frank through
its provision of rule-making authority to the SEC to harmonize regulatory stan-
dards of care for brokers, dealers, and investment advisers "when providing
personalized investment advice about securities to retail customers (and
such other customers as the Commission may by rule provide)."21 The SEC
Study Report examined broker-dealers' standard of conduct toward retail
investors, and recommended the establishment of a uniform fiduciary stan-
dard applicable to all brokers, dealers and investment advisers in providing
22investment advice to retail customers. However, the SEC expressed a con-
tinuing interest in considering whether such uniformity "should also be
16 790 F. Supp. 2d at 150-51.
17 See Factbox: Levin, Blankfein Trade Jabs at Hearing, REUTERS (Apr. 27, 2010,
9:27 PM), http://mobile.reuters.com/article/topNews/idUSTRE63RO3320100428.
18 156 CONG. REc. S3104, SA 3792 (daily ed. May 4, 2010).
19 156 CONG. REc. S3109, SA 3806 (daily ed. May 4, 2010).
20 See, e.g., Moloney, supra note 14.
21 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203,
§ 913(k)(1), 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (emphasis added).
22 See SEC STUDY REPORT, supra note 4, at 107-08.
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extended to persons other than retail customers that may also benefit from
the additional investor protections that would be provided by the standard."23
This Article answers the above inquiry about Dodd-Frank and the SEC
regarding the advisability of a fiduciary standard in broker-dealers' relation-
ships with institutional investors. It examines this issue from an angle that,
until now, has been overlooked by proponents and opponents alike in this
debate. Because investment advisers are recognized as fiduciaries but broker-
dealers are generally not, clients perceive that standard of conduct for broker-
dealers is different when providing advice to investors. This perception is
intuitive and seemingly reasonable. However, both investment advisers and
broker-dealers are subject to elaborate, albeit different, sets of regulations that
have, at least on the surface, some overlap in the scope of the obligations they
owe to clients. For example, both investment advisers and broker-dealers are
obligated to refrain from committing fraud when advising clients, which in-
cludes making recommendations with reckless disregard to the suitability of
the recommendation to the clients' financial goals and risk tolerance.24 In as-
sessing suitability, both investment advisers and broker-dealers are required
to disclose information pertinent to the investment decision of the client, such
as any conflict of interest.25 Could it be that the substance of the suitability
requirement applicable to broker-dealers is no less stringent than that appli-
cable to investment advisers, even though broker-dealers are not fiduciaries?
In addition, what about enforcement and remedies available to investors
when the prescribed standard of conduct is violated? Could it be that rem-
edies (or the lack thereof) to investors are comparable regardless of whether
the defendant is an investment adviser or a broker-dealer? If the two sets
of regulations and their enforcements are comparable in every major way, the
alleged regulatory disparity between investment advisers and broker-dealers
exist only in the imagination, and this in turn means that explicitly recogniz-
ing broker-dealers as fiduciaries would not enhance investor protection in
any visible measure.
This Article will show that in the institutional investor setting, rules
regulating the conduct of investment advisers and broker-dealers, when pro-
viding investment advice, are indeed substantially similar. But there is an
exception when FINRA's exemption rule applies, which exempts broker-
dealers from performing a suitability analysis for certain qualified institu-
tional clients. 26 That means a uniform fiduciary standard can benefit-at
most-only a small sub-group of institutional investors: those who have
23 Id. at 127 (emphasis added).
24 See discussion infra Part I.
25 See discussion infra Part I.
26 See discussion infra Part I.C.
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substantial capital (at least $50 million in assets), who acknowledge in writ-
ing that they are not relying on the advice of the broker-dealer, and who the
broker-dealer reasonably believes are capable of independently assessing
the risks of their transactions. So far, proponents and opponents of a uni-
form fiduciary standard have argued about whether institutional investors in
general need more protection, and proponents have pointed out that some
27institutional investors are not as sophisticated as they appear. The conclu-
sion of this Article suggests that, in debating this issue, we should not look
at the entire institutional investor group as a whole, but rather we should
focus only on the subset of institutional investors whose interactions with
broker-dealers are exempt from the FINRA suitability rules. Under this
fine focus, the potential benefit of a uniform fiduciary duty is far narrower
than what its proponents believe.
This Article further shows that institutional investors face substantial
obstacles in their private actions against broker-dealers. The obstacles arise
from the limitation of investors to causes of action related to fraud, which
require them to prove "reasonable reliance" on broker-dealers' advice. By
including elaborate disclaimer provisions in an investment contract and re-
quiring institutional investors to sign before consummating a transaction,
broker-dealers can prevent investors from establishing reasonable reliance
and thus thwart recovery. Fiduciary duty on the part of broker-dealers will not
help in this regard, as courts have been disposed to enforce such disclaimers
even if a fiduciary duty were to exist. The potential benefit of a uniform fi-
duciary seems impalpable, and yet its potential problems abound, as will
be discussed in this Article.
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I compares the standard of conduct
applicable to investment advisers with that applicable to broker-dealers when
they provide investment advice to institutional investors. The comparison
shows a substantial similarity in the respective standards of conduct, and
highlights FINRA's suitability exemption as the main source of disparity.
Part II discusses enforcement mechanisms when investment advisers and
broker-dealers violate their standard of conduct, highlighting their similar-
ity, the lack of meaningful private remedies to institutional investors, and the
inability of fiduciary duty to change this outcome. Part III draws regulatory
implications from the discussions in the previous parts, suggesting that a uni-
form fiduciary duty is not the solution to institutional investor protection in
light of the limited benefit it generates and the substantial regulatory inco-
herence it creates. Instead, Congress and the SEC should focus their inquiry
27 See, e.g., 156 CONG. REc. S3104, SA 3792 (daily ed. May 4, 2010). But see discus-
sion infra Part II.
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on broadening the scope of investors' private rights of action abandoning
the current contractarian approach to enforcing disclaimer provisions in in-
vestment contracts.
I. THE STANDARD OF CONDUCT OF INVESTMENT ADVISERS AND
BROKER-DEALERS IN ADVISING INSTITUTIONAL CLIENTS
A. The Standard of Conduct ofInvestment Advisers
1. Investment Advisers Act Provisions
The Investment Advisers Act broadly defines an investment adviser as:
any person who, for compensation, engages in the business of advising
others, either directly or through publications or writings, as to the value
of securities or as to the advisability of investing in, purchasing, or sell-
ing securities, or who, for compensation and as part of a regular business,
issues or promulgates analyses or reports concerning securities....28
Broker-dealers, who otherwise would be covered in this broad definition,
are explicitly exempted from the Investment Advisers Act if certain conditions
are satisfied.29 While the overall anti-fraud provisions of the Securities Act and
the Exchange Act apply to "any person" (including investment advisers) in
connection with any securities transaction, the specific duties of investment
advisers in advising investors are provided in section 206 of the Investment
Advisers Act.30 This section has been regarded by the U.S. Supreme Court as
the source of federal fiduciary standards governing the conduct of invest-
31
ment advisers. Section 206 prohibits an investment adviser from:
1. employing any device or scheme to defraud any client or
prospective client;
2. engaging in any conduct which operates as a fraud upon any
client or prospective client;
28 Investment Advisers Act of 1940 § 202(a)(11), 15 U.S.C.A. § 80b-2 (West 2013).
29 See discussion infra Part I.A.3.
30 The Securities Act and the Exchange Act do not have specific provisions like sec-
tion 206 of the Investment Advisers Act that prescribe broker-dealers standard of conduct in
dealing with clients; rather broker-dealers' duties are based on the general anti-fraud provi-
sions in those statutes. Therefore, discussions of the general anti-fraud provisions are de-
ferred to section B in the context of broker-dealers' duties under the federal securities law.
31 Transamerica Mortg. Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 17 (1979). See also SEC
v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 194 (1963).
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3. selling securities for his own account without disclosing this
fact and obtaining consent of his client; or
4. engaging in any conduct that is "fraudulent, deceptive, or
32manipulative" under the rules of the SEC.
The key difference between the first and the second prohibition, enu-
merated above, is that a violation of the former requires scienter as a nec-
essary mental state while a violation of the latter requires only proof of
negligence.33 Section 206 explicitly states that the disclosure requirement in-
cluded in the third prohibition, above, applies only to a broker-dealer acting
as an investment adviser in the transaction.34 But as will be discussed in the
next section, broker-dealers are subject to an obligation to disclose conflicts
of interest under the anti-fraud provisions of the Securities Act, the Exchange
Act, and FINRA rules.
2. Interpretation ofInvestment Advisers'Duties under Section 206
The SEC has interpreted section 206 as imposing the following duties
on investment advisers:
* a duty of "good faith, and full and fair disclosure of all ma-
terial facts[;]"3 5
* a duty to recommend only securities that are suitable for the
investor in light of his goals and risk tolerance;36 and
* a duty of loyalty that "requires an adviser to serve the best
interests of his clients, which [duty] includes an obligation
not to subordinate the client's interests" to that of the in-
-37vestment adviser.
The satisfaction of these obligations requires an investment adviser to
use reasonable care so as not to mislead current and prospective clients.38
a. Duty of Good Faith and Full and Fair Disclosure ofAll
Material Facts
Specific Disclosures in Brochures. Section 206 is a principle-based
regulation, so the extent of disclosures required under this section depends
32 Investment Advisers Act of 1940 § 206, 15 U.S.C.A. § 80b-6 (West 2013).
33 See SEC v. Seghers, 298 F. App'x 319, 328 (5th Cir. 2008) (noting that scienter is
required to show a violation of section 206(1), but negligence is sufficient to show a vio-
lation of section 206(2)).
34 See Investment Advisers Act § 206.
35 SEC STUDY REPORT, supra note 4, at 22 (citing Capital Gains, 375 U.S. at 194).
36 Id. at 27-28.
37 Id. at 22.
38 d.
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on the facts and circumstances of each transaction. 39 Nonetheless, the SEC
has established specific disclosure requirements when a financial-service pro-
vider files Form ADV with the SEC to register as an investment adviser.40
The Form consists of two parts. Part 1 requires information about the invest-
ment adviser's business, ownership, clients, employees, business practices
affiliations, and any disciplinary events of the adviser or its employees.
Part 2 specifies information that must be included in an investment adviser's
brochure used in marketing the adviser's service.42
A brochure is the primary disclosure document an investment adviser
provides to his client before or at the time an advisory relationship is es-
tablished.43 An investment adviser is required to update the brochure each
year when it files the annual updating amendment to its registration state-
ments, and "promptly whenever any information in the brochure becomes
materially inaccurate."4 4
Item 8 of Part 2 requires an investment adviser to disclose in its brochure
the methods of analysis and investment strategies. Specifically, Item 8 sets
forth the following requirements:
A. Describe the methods of analysis and investment strategies you use
in formulating investment advice or managing assets. Explain that in-
vesting in securities involves risk of loss that clients should be prepared
to bear.
B. For each significant investment strategy or method of analysis you
use, explain the material risks involved. If the method of analysis or
strategy involves significant or unusual risks, discuss these risks in detail.
If your primary strategy involves frequent trading of securities, explain
how frequent trading can affect investment performance, particularly
through increased brokerage and other transaction costs and taxes.
C. If you recommend primarily a particular type of security, explain the
material risks involved. If the type of security involves significant or
unusual risks, discuss these risks in detail.45
Note that the intent is for the previous disclosures to be made in an in-
vestment adviser's brochure. They are not transaction specific unless the ad-
viser uses primarily only one type of strategy. However, as discussed below,
39 Id. at 104.
40 Form ADV is the uniform form used by investment advisers to register with both the
SEC and state securities authorities. See generally Form ADV, U.S. SEC. & ExCH. CoMM'N,
http://www.sec.gov/answers/formadv.htm (last visited Jan. 12, 2014).
41Id
42 Id
43 See SEC, FoRm ADV (2011) at pt. 2A, 1-2, available at http://www.sec.gov
/about/forms/formadv.pdf [hereinafter FORM ADV].
44 See id. at pt. 2A, 4 (emphasis omitted).
4 Id. at pt. 2A, Item 8(A)-(C).
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more detailed and transaction-specific disclosures may be required in addi-
tion to those made in the brochure in order for an adviser to satisfy its duties
under the Investment Advisers Act.
The SEC has indicated that the duty of disclosure under section 206 is
broad and may not be completely satisfied by the mere delivery of a bro-
46
chure. Material facts have been interpreted as information that there is a
"substantial likelihood that a reasonable investor would consider important
in making [investment] decision[s]...."a The SEC has explicitly recognized
that any conflict of interest on the part of an adviser is a material fact and its
disclosure is necessary for clients to make an informed decision as to whether
or not to continue the advisory relationship.4 8 The SEC has taken disciplinary
actions against investment advisers for failure to disclose conflicts of interest.4
Although there are only a few SEC actions against investment advisers for
violating section 206 in their relationship with institutional investor clients,
such actions reveal the stringent standard with which the SEC is enforcing the
statutory requirement of full disclosure of material facts. In New York Life
Investment Management LLC, the investment adviser-New York Life
Investment Management LLC-managed an open-end index fund that
sought to replicate the movements of the S&P 500 Index before expenses.
There was a guarantee provision in the investment advisory contract under
which New York Life agreed to make up any shortfall through an affiliated
entity for an investor, if his investment in the fund was less than his original
investment on the tenth anniversary of that investment, provided that the in-
vestor remained in the fund for the entire period and reinvested all distri-
butions (the Guarantee).5 0 New York Life's 2005 profitability analysis for
the fund reflected a negative 103 percent profit margin due to the inclusion
46 SEC STUDY REPORT, supra note 4, at 23. See also FORM ADV at pt. 2, § 3 ("Under
federal and state law, you are a fiduciary and must make full disclosure to your clients of
all material facts relating to the advisory relationship. As a fiduciary, you also must seek to
avoid conflicts of interest with your clients, and, at a minimum, make full disclosure of all
material conflicts of interests between you and your clients that could affect the advisory
relationship. This obligation requires that you provide the client with sufficiently specific
facts so that the client is able to understand the conflicts of interest you have and the busi-
ness practices in which you engage, and can give you informed consent to such conflicts or
practices or reject them. To satisfy this obligation, you therefore may have to disclose to
clients information not specifically required by Part 2 of Form ADV or in more detail
than the brochure items might otherwise require.").
0 SEC v. Slocum, Gordon & Co., 334 F. Supp. 2d 144, 182 (D.R.I. 2004).
4 SEC STUDY REPORT, supra note 4, at 23 & n.92.
9 1d. at 22 & n.89.
5 N.Y. Life Inv. Mgmt. LLC, Investment Advisers Act Release No. 2883, Investment
Company Act Release No. 28747, n.2 (May 27, 2009).
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of a $9.9 million expense for a reserve for the Guarantee.5 However, New
York Life did not provide the fund's board of trustees with "information
concerning the assumptions used to calculate the reserve [n]or explain
why [it] believed the full amount of the increase to the reserve should be
included in the analysis of the profitability" as opposed to being amortized
over a period of time.52 Without considering this reserve amount, the fund
would have shown a profit margin of 31 percent.53 The SEC faulted New
York Life under section 206(2) of the Investment Advisers Act for its failure
to provide such an explanation, although there was no evidence suggesting
that the omission was intentional or that the board requested an explanation
and New York Life failed to respond.
In Charles Schwab Investment Management; Charles Schwab & Co.;
and Schwab Investments, the SEC issued a cease-and-desist order against
the named entities (collectively, Charles Schwab) for misrepresenting the
nature of the Yieldplus Bond Fund, an ultra-short bond fund managed by
55Charles Schwab, as a cash alternative. The Yieldplus Bond Fund was
Charles Schwab's best performing fund until the 2008 financial crisis
when it suffered a loss of 28 percent in net asset value due to an overcon-
56
centration of its investments in mortgage-related securities. From at least
2006 to 2008, Charles Schwab marketed the fund as a cash alternative that
generated a higher yield with slightly higher risk than a money market fund.
Charles Schwab noted-truthfully-in marketing materials that the net
asset value of the fund would fluctuate, and that it "experienced some vola-
tility from its inception in 1999 through 2002, and then fluctuated by pen-
nies during the next several years."5 The SEC stated that describing the
Yieldplus Fund as a cash alternative was misleading because "[i]nvestments
51 Id. at 5.
52 Id. at 5-6.
53 Id. at 6.
51Id. at 7.
5 Charles Schwab Inv. Mgmt.; Charles Schwab & Co.; and Schwab Invs., Securities
Act Release No. 9171, Exchange Act Release No. 63693, Investment Advisers Act Release
No. 3136, Investment Company Act Release No. 29552 (Jan. 11, 2011). The SEC also
faulted Charles Schwab for a misstatement about the weighted average maturity of its
assets, a deviation from stated asset concentration policy without shareholder approval,
and a misrepresentation with regard to investors' redemption when the fund lost in value.
See id. at 5-8.
56 This level of decline exceeded the typical loss suffered by other ultm-short bond funds.
In addition to the investment loss, investors' panic withdrawals from the fund caused the
amount of assets under management to fall from $13.5 billion to $1.8 billion. Id. at 4; see
also Walter Hamilton, Schwab Settles SEC Suit Over Fund, L.A. TIMEs, Jan 12, 2011, at Bl.
5 See Charles Schwab Inv. Mgmt., at 2.
51Id. at 4.
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in the Fund are not insured, as are CDs, and the maturity and credit quality
of the Fund's securities were significantly different than those of a money
market fund." 59 The SEC claimed that such misleading statements violated
60
section 206 of the Investment Advisers Act. It is worth noting that market-
ing the fund as a cash alternative was consistent with the view held by many
financial industry professionals that ultra-short bond funds were a viable al-
ternative to putting money in cash, and indeed some ultra-short bond funds
even allowed check-writing privileges on money invested in the funds.61
Nonetheless, the SEC believed that the cash-alternative description was
short of complete accuracy on the nature of an ultra-short bond fund.62
The Charles Schwab case illustrates the high standard that the SEC applies
in regulating the behaviors of investment advisers under section 206 of the
Investment Advisers Act.
b. Duty ofMaking Only Recommendations Suitable to Clients
The SEC views section 206 of the Investment Advisers Act as requiring
an investment adviser to refrain from recommending securities to clients
that the adviser does not reasonably believe are suitable for the clients' in-
63
vestment goals and financial conditions. In 1994, the SEC proposed rules
to make suitability an explicit obligation under section 206 and codify its
previous interpretations on suitability in disciplinary actions and no-action
letters.64 Although the SEC has not taken further actions on this proposal
59 d.
601 d. at 10.
61 See, e.g., Meg Richards, Money Market Funds Are Closing the Yield Gap, WASH.
POST, Dec. 4, 2005, at F4 ("For the past several years, ultra-short bond funds have served
as a higher-yielding alternative to money market mutual funds, but the gap in returns has
rapidly been closing."); see also Donald Jay Kom & Robert Neubecker, It's a Good Year
for CASH: With Interest Rates Up and Other Assets Flat or Sinking, Cash is a Winning
Bet As WellAs a Safe One, FINANCIAL PLANNING (Oct. 1, 2006), http://www.financial-planning
.com/news/its-good-year-cash-527823-1.html (quoting Kathleen Grace, director of family
office services at Carl Domino, Inc., an investment management firm in Palm Beach and
Boca Raton: "Cash is especially important in tumultuous markets.... For the past year, I've
been using Schwab YieldPlus Fund, which has worked very well for taxable accounts. The
yield has been attractive and this fund has avoided erosion of principal, so it has been a
good alternative to a money market fund.").
62 Charles Schwab Inv. Mgmt., at 2.
63 SEC STUDY REPORT, supra note 4, at i.
64 The proposal states:
Investment advisers are fiduciaries who owe their clients a series of duties,
one of which is the duty to provide only suitable investment advice. This
duty is enforceable under the antifraud provision of the Advisers Act,
section 206, and the Commission has sanctioned advisers for violating
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as of this date, the proposed release is an important document as it reflects the
* 65SEC's view on the scope of an investment adviser's suitability obligations.
The suitability requirement applies to recommendations made to both
retail and institutional investors.66 Suitability must be determined in light of
the client's investment portfolio.67 Risky investment products can only be
recommended to those clients "who can and are willing to tolerate the risks
and for whom the potential benefits justify the risks."68
To satisfy the suitability requirement, an investment adviser has a duty to
make "a reasonable inquiry into the client's financial situation, investment
experience and investment objectives."69 What constitutes a reasonable in-
quiry depends on the circumstances of each investor, but the SEC believes
that information on the investor's "current income, investments, assets and
debts, marital status, insurance policies, and financial goals" is all within the
range of a reasonable inquiry.7 0 In this regard, initial information-gathering
this duty. The Commission now proposes to make explicit this duty in a
new rule under section 206(4) of the Advisers Act. The scope of proposed
rule 206(4)-5 reflects the Commission's interpretation of advisers' suit-
ability obligations under the Advisers Act.
Suitability of Investment Advice Provided by Investment Advisers, Investment Advisers
Act Release No. 1406, at 2 (Mar. 22, 1994).
65 The SEC Study Report referred to this regulatory action as proposed rules. SEC
STUDY REPORT, supra note 4, at 27 n. 109. Under the proposed rule, the SEC would adopt
the new rule "§ 275.206(4)-5 Suitability of Investment Advice Provided by Investment
Advisors," which would "make express the fiduciary obligation of investment advisers to
make only suitable recommendations to a client, after a reasonable inquiry into the client's
financial situation, investment experience, and investment objectives" and "would prohibit
registered investment advisers from exercising investment discretion with respect to client
accounts unless they have a reasonable belief that the custodians of those accounts send
account statements to the clients no less frequently than quarterly." Suitability of Investment
Advice Provided by Investment Advisers, 59 Fed. Reg. 55 (proposed Mar. 22, 1994) (to be
codified at 17 C.F.R. 275.206(5)-4). The current rule § 275.206(4)-5 is entitled "Political
contributions by certain investment advisers." See Commodity and Securities Exchanges,
17 C.F.R. § 275.206(4)-5 (2013), available at http://ecfr.gpoaccess.gov/cgi/t/text/text-idx
?c=ecfr&tpl=/ecfrbrowse/Title 17/17cfr275 main 02.tpl.
66 See Suitability of Investment Advice Provided by Investment Advisers, supra note
64, at 3 n.Il ("The prohibition against providing unsuitable advice would apply to advice to
institutional clients as well as to individual clients. Institutional investors have experienced
significant losses as a result of recommendations to invest in complex financial products
that they did not fully understand.").
67 Id. at 3.
68 d
69 Id. at 1. See also SEC STUDY REPORT, supra note 4, at 22 (citing SEC Concept Release
on the U.S. Proxy System, Investment Advisers Act Release No. 3052 (July 14, 2010) at 119).
7o See Suitability of Investment Advice Provided by Investment Advisers, supra note
64, at 2.
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meetings, where clients are typically asked to complete questionnaires to
provide the adviser with information necessary to develop recommenda-
tions, a financial plan, or specific investments, would generally satisfy the
requirement. In addition, the adviser is required to periodically update this
information so that the initial advice for new offerings accurately takes into
consideration any changed circumstances of the client.72
An adviser may rely on information provided by clients in regard to his
financial condition. 3 In the event that a client refuses to provide informa-
tion, the adviser is limited to only making reasonable assumptions about the
client . Absent information otherwise, the adviser may have to adopt a de-
fault assumption that the client's only assets or sources of income are those
under the management of the adviser. When the client refuses to provide
the information needed for recommendations, "the adviser [is] ... permitted
to rely upon trustworthy information about the client that it obtains from other
reliable sources, such as a consultant to the client or other intermediary."76 In
addition, the SEC has opined that an investment adviser is not imputed with
the knowledge of an affiliate for the purpose of assessing suitability if the
expectation that the adviser know the information is unreasonable. For in-
stance, an adviser may not have information about a recommended security
that an affiliated adviser may have, such as when the investment adviser has
established and followed procedures as required by section 204A of the
Investment Advisers Act to prevent insider trading.7 8
3. The Broker-Dealer Exemption from the Investment Advisers Act
Section 202(a)(1 1)(C) explicitly excludes a broker-dealer who provides
advice to clients from the definition of investment adviser if:
* such advice is "solely incidental to the conduct of his busi-
ness as a broker or dealer;" and










79 Investment Advisers Act of 1940 § 202(a)(11)(C), 15 U.S.C.A. § 80b-2(a)(11)(C)
(West 2013).
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The boundaries of both conditions were tested in recent cases in which
investors sought to avail themselves of the protection of the Investment
Advisers Act.
a. The Meaning of "Solely Incidental"
The meaning of "solely incidental" for purposes of the section 202(a)
(1 1)(C) exemption was interpreted by the Western District of Oklahoma in
Thomas v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Company.so The plaintiffs wished to
undertake financial planning to provide for their new-born daughter's future
college education.8 Toward this goal, they purchased a variable universal
life policy from an acquaintance that was employed by the defendant insur-
ance company (MetLife) to sell insurance products.82 The plaintiffs wrote a
check for the first $91 monthly premium, but never paid any separate fee for
any investment advice provided to them by MetLife's sales personnel. 83 The
product's sales prospectus said that 2.25 percent of the premiums were dedi-
cated to compensating the sales personnel in the form of commission.8 4
Subsequently, the plaintiffs sued for the cancellation of the policy and resti-
tution of the premium paid on the ground that MetLife failed to disclose a
conflict of interest in violation of the Investment Advisers Act.85 The al-
leged conflict arose from the fact MetLife compensated sales staff based on
how many proprietary products they sold, and if the sales staff failed to sell
enough products, they might be terminated. 86 The issue presented to the
court was whether, for the purpose of the broker-dealer exemption under
section 202(a)(1 1)(C) of the Investment Advisers Act, the quantum of ad-
vice given by a broker-dealer should be considered in determining whether
the advice was "solely incidental" to the conduct of his business as a broker-
dealer, such as, trade execution. The court determined the meaning of "solely
incidental to" as "solely attendant to" or "solely in connection with" a broker-
dealer's business of trade execution.
Under this interpretation, the court concluded the quantum of advice pro-
vided by the broker did not render the broker ineligible for the exemption.89
80 Thomas v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., No. CIV-07-0121-F, 2009 WL 2778663 (W.D. Okla.
Aug. 31, 2009).
81 Id. at *2.
82 Id.
83 Id.
" Id. at *8 n.15.
15 Id. at *1.
86 d
17 Id. at *3.
" Id. at *7.
89 Id. at *5-9.
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The court cited the SEC's statement that the broker-dealer exemption
amounts to:
a recognition [by Congress] that brokers and dealers commonly give a
certain amount of advice to their customers in the course of their regu-
lar business, and that it would be inappropriate to bring them within the
scope of the Investment Advisers Act merely because of this aspect of
their business.90
While "certain amount" can refer to both a significant amount of work and
a minor amount, the court stated that the word "commonly" suggested that
Congress was aware at the time of enacting the Investment Advisers Act
that brokers were commonly giving advice.91 According to the court,
"[s]omething that is common is unlikely to be minor or insignificant or
rarely occurring."92 Moreover, the court pointed out the fact that brokers
are required under FINRA rules to perform an elaborate suitability analy-
sis when recommending securities to clients, which analysis requires sub-
stantial interactions between a broker and his clients above and beyond a
simple trade execution. 93 Therefore, the court stated that interpreting "solely
incidental to" as "'minor' or 'insignificant"' would result in broker-dealers
losing the statutory exemption if they attempt to fulfill their duties under
FINRA rules. 94
The court's interpretation was affirmed on appeal by the Tenth Circuit,
which pointed out that the purpose of the Investment Advisers Act was not
to regulate brokers, even though Congress was aware they provided invest-
ment advice to clients in facilitating trade executions.95 The SEC has held
the same interpretation of the congressional intent behind the Investment
Advisers Act. In the SEC release titled Certain Broker-Dealers Not to Be
Investment Advisers,96 the SEC stated there were two types of brokerage
advice when the statute was first introduced:
* advice as an "auxiliary component of traditional brokerage
services[,]" which could be extensive with the provision of
a wide range of information such as analyses of the financial
90 1d. at *5.
911d.
92 Id.
93 Id. at *6.
94 Id. at *6-7.
95 Thomas v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 631 F.3d 1153, 1164 (10th Cir. 2011).
96 Certain Broker-Dealers Deemed Not To Be Investment Advisers, 17 C.F.R. pt. 275
(2005).
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conditions of corporations, municipalities and governments,
and tax schedules and consequences; 97 and
* advice provided by a special department within the broker-
age firm for the purpose of providing advice (as opposed to
facilitating brokerage services) to customers for a fee. 98
The SEC pointed out that Congress knew of the above two types of
advice and decided to exempt the former because it was already subject to
regulation.99 The SEC has acknowledged the blurry line between the con-
duct of broker-dealers and investment advisers, but it holds the view that
subjecting broker-dealers to the Investment Advisers Act is not the solu-
tion as it is inconsistent with congressional intent. 100
The Thomas case sent a clear signal that any advice given by a broker
to his clients is deemed "solely incidental to" his brokerage service if the
broker charges only a commission for executing trades.101 The amount of
advice given by the broker in his interactions with clients is irrelevant to the
determination of whether the broker qualifies for the exemption under the
Investment Advisers Act.
b. The Meaning of "Special Compensation"
To be exempt from the Investment Advisers Act, a broker-dealer must
not receive special compensation for providing advice in connection with his
brokerage services. 102 Special compensation is not defined in the Investment
Advisers Act, but the Senate Banking and Currency Committee Report,
issued when the statute was enacted, stated brokers qualify for the exemp-
tion "insofar as their advice is merely incidental to brokerage transactions
for which they receive only brokerage commissions."1 03
97 Id. at 18.
98 Id. at 17.
99 Id. at 24-25, 32. Note that the D.C. Circuit disagreed with the SEC's interpretation
that Congress intended to avoid dual regulation for broker-dealers. The court stated that the
sole purpose of the Investment Advisers Act was "to protect the public from the frauds and
misrepresentations of unscrupulous tipsters and touts and to safeguard the honest invest-
ment adviser against the stigma of the activities of these individuals by making fraudulent
practices by investment advisers unlawful." Fin. Planning Ass'n v. SEC, 482 F.3d 481,
483-84 (2006) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
100 17 C.F.R. pt. 275, at 37.
101 Thomas v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., No. CIV-07-0121-F, 2009 WL 2778663, at *7-9
(W.D. Okla. 2009), aff'd, 631 F.3d 1153 (10th Cir. 2011).
102 17 C.F.R. pt. 275, at 5.
103 S. REP. No. 76-1775, at 22 (1940).
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Traditionally a broker is compensated in the form of a commission set
as a percentage of the value of the trade he has executed on behalf of his
client,10 4 and an investment adviser is compensated in the form of an advisory
fee set as a percentage of the value of the asset under his management.1 05
However, in Wiener v. Eaton Vance Distributors, Inc., the broker's com-
pensation was partly in the form of a percentage of the assets of the fund
whose shares the broker helped sell. 10 6 The plaintiff, who was a shareholder
of the fund, sent a letter to the board of the fund asking the fund to change
this compensation mode and to refund all past payments to the broker of such
asset-based compensation. 107 Upon the board's refusal, the plaintiff brought
a lawsuit alleging this compensation constituted special compensation that
disqualified the broker for the Investment Advisers Act exemption.108 Since
the broker had not registered with the SEC as an investment adviser, any non-
transactional asset-based compensation to the broker was argued by the
plaintiff to be a violation of the statute and thus void. 109
The court stated the focal point of the inquiry was whether the compen-
sation to the broker was specifically for his rendition of advice to investors
in the fund.110 Since the Distribution Plan of the funds described the asset-
based fee as being for "marketing support and administrative services," and
at the most, such fees were for a bundle of services, including advice, the
plaintiff had to unbundle the fee specifically attributable to the provision
of the advice from the rest of the package in order to characterize the fee
as special compensation.1
The courts in Wiener and Thomas set a high bar for investors to over-
come in order to sue broker-dealers under the Investment Advisers Act. 112
Broker-dealers can provide their clients advice that is as extensive as that
given by investment advisers, but are nonetheless exempt from the federal
104 SEC STUDY REPORT, supra note 4, at 10-11.
105T Id. at 7.
106 Wiener v. Eaton Vance Distribs., Inc., No. 10-10515-DPW, 2011 WL 1233131, at *2
(D. Mass. 2011).
107 Id.
108 Id. at *3.
109 Id. at *9.
110 See id. at *10 ("As described above, courts rely on fact-based inquiries into the
compensation paid, the services rendered, and evaluation of the connection between the
two in determining whether the exemption applies.").
111 See id. ("The most that can be said is that 12b-1 fees, even asset-based 12b-1 fees,
compensate broker-dealers for a bundle of services including advice. But the advisory ser-
vices are not unbundled in any fashion that could be characterized as 'special' as opposed
to incidental.").
112 See supra notes 81-95, 107-11 and accompanying text.
2014] 73
74 WILLIAM & MARY BUSINESS LAW REVIEW
fiduciary standard of section 206 of the Investment Advisers Act so long
as broker-dealers can attribute their compensation as commission for trade
execution. Moreover, an asset-based compensation structure does not auto-
matically hail broker-dealers into the realm of the Investment Advisers Act
unless investors can pinpoint the part of the compensation that is specifi-
cally attributable to the provision of advice.
B. The Standard of Conduct ofBroker-Dealers
A broker-dealer's standard of conduct in providing personalized invest-
ment advice to investors is prescribed by the anti-fraud provisions of federal
securities laws and by FINRA rules. The suitability requirement forms a
critical component of these regulations, as will be discussed below.
1. The Anti-fraud Provisions in Federal Securities Law
Section 17(a) of the Securities Act and section 10(b) of the Exchange
Act-together with SEC Rule lOb-5-provide against fraud in securities
transactions. Section 17(a) prohibits anyone from "employ[ing] any device
to defraud [or] engage in any [conduct] that operates as a fraud" in connec-
tion with an offer or sale of securities or any security-based swaps. 113 The
Supreme Court has construed this section to cover any fraudulent scheme in
an offer or sale of securities, whether in the course of an initial distribution
or in the course of ordinary market trading. Section 17(a) has three sub-
sections: 17(a)(1) prohibits the use of "any device, scheme, or artifice to
defraud," while 17(a)(2) and (a)(3) prohibit omissions or misstatements of
material facts and conduct that "would operate as a fraud or deceit upon the
purchaser."11 5 Section 17(a)(1) has generally been held to require proof of
scienter comparable to that necessary for a violation of section 10(b) of the
Exchange Act and SEC Rule 1Ob-5. 116 Section 17(a)(2) and (a)(3), however,
can be satisfied by proof of negligence.1 17 For this reason, section 17(a)(2)
and (a)(3) are often called negligence-based fraud provisions.
113 Securities Act of 1933 § 17(a), 15 U.S.C.A. § 77q(a) (West 2013).
114 United States v. Naftalin, 441 U.S. 768, 777-78 (1979); see also Cent. Bank of
Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 511 U.S. 164, 171-72 (1994);
SEC v. Tambone, 550 F.3d 106, 120 (1st Cir. 2008) (citing Greebel v. FTP Software, Inc.
194 F.3d 185, 196 (1st Cir. 1999).
115 Securities Act of 1933 § 17(a).
116 See infra notes 119-22 and accompanying text.
117 Aaronv. SEC, 446 U.S. 680, 685, 701-02 (1980).
118 See, e.g., Thomas 0. Gonan, Trends in SEC Financial Fraud Actions: Part II,
LAw360 (May 6, 2011), http://www.dorsey.com/files/upload/GoremanTrendsInSEC_2
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Section 10(b) prohibits any person from using or employing any manip-
ulative or fraudulent device in contravention of the SEC rules in connec-
tion with the purchase or sale of any security or a securities-based swap
agreement.119 Rule 10b-5, promulgated by the SEC under this section, pro-
hibits any person from employing any device to defraud, or engaging in any
conduct that operates as fraud, in connection with a purchase or sale of
securities, or making any untrue statement of material fact, or failing to state
a material fact that is necessary in order to make the statement made not
misleading. 120 Although the text of Rule lOb-5 is nearly identical to the text
of section 17(a) of the Securities Act, there are key distinctions between the
respective scopes of these provisions. First, section 17(a) applies only to
sellers of (or those who offer to sell) securities, whereas Rule 1Ob-5 applies
to both sellers and purchasers of securities. 12 1 Second, Rule lOb-5 reaches
only conduct leading to a consummated securities transaction-whether sale
or purchase-and does not extend to an unconsummated offer to sell or
purchase securities.122 In the context of a broker-dealer recommending a
particular security for his clients to purchase, section 17(a) is broader than
section 10(b) in the sense that it encompasses the broker-dealer's conduct
whether or not the clients ultimately choose to follow the recommendation.
Just as the SEC has interpreted section 206 of the Investment Advisers
Act as imposing a suitability obligation on investment advisers, the SEC
holds the view that the above anti-fraud provisions of the Securities Act and
the Exchange Act encompass an obligation on a broker-dealer to recommend
only securities that are suitable to the customer's financial conditions, in-
vestment objectives, and risk tolerance.123 Moreover, just as section 206 of
the Investment Advisers Act holds an investment adviser liable for inten-
tional, reckless, as well as negligent violations of his suitability obligation,
sections 17(a)(2) and (a)(3) subject a broker-dealer to liability for having in-
tentionally, recklessly, or negligently offered or sold unsuitable securities
to clients.124 In contrast, liability under section 10(b) of the Exchange Act
.pdf. See also Audrey Strauss, The SEC's Recent Interest in Negligence-Based Charges,
246 N.Y. L.J. 87 (2011).
119 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b).
120 17 C.F.R. 240.10b-5.
121 SEC v. Tambone, 550 F.3d 106, 122 (1st Cir. 2008).
122 d.
123 "The concept of suitability has been interpreted as an obligation under the anti-
fraud provisions of the federal securities laws." SEC STUDY REPORT, supra note 4, at 59.
124 See, e.g., In re Wells Fargo Brokerage Serys., SEC Administrative Proceeding File
No. 3-14982, Securities Act of 1933 Release No. 9349, Securities Exchange Act of 1934
Release No. 67649, Investment Company Act of 1940 Release No. 30167 (Aug. 14,
2012) ("Wells Fargo and McMurtry were, at a minimum, negligent in recommending the
relevant asset-backed commercial paper programs without obtaining adequate information
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and SEC Rule 1Ob-5 cannot be based on negligence, but requires intentional
or reckless conduct. 125
2. FINRA's Suitability Requirements
FINRA's suitability requirements are stated in FINRA Rule 2090 (Know
Your Customer) and Rule 2111 (Suitability). 126 Rule 2090 is modeled after
Rule 405 of the New York Stock Exchange and corresponding interpretative
materials, 127 and Rule 2111 is modeled after Rule 2310 of FINRA's pre-
decessor, the National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc. (NASD), and
NASD's interpretative materials. 12 8 Both rules took effect in July 2012.129
a. FINRA Rule 2090 (Know Your Customer)
Rule 2090 provides: "Every member shall use reasonable diligence, in re-
gard to the opening and maintenance of every account, to know (and retain)
the essential facts concerning every customer and concerning the authority of
each person acting on behalf of such customer."1 30 Rule 2090.01 requires a
broker know the customer's essential facts in order to "(a) effectively service
the customer's account, (b) act in accordance with any special handling in-
structions for the account, (c) understand the authority of each person acting
on behalf of the customer, and (d) comply with applicable laws, regulations,
about them to form a reasonable basis for recommending these products and without dis-
closing the material risks of these products. As a result, Wells Fargo and McMurtry vio-
lated Sections 17(a)(2) and 17(a)(3) of the Securities Act." (emphasis added)). See also
Gorman, supra note 118. Note that in the SEC STUDY REPORT, supra note 4, at 61, the
SEC stated that:
[tlo establish a violation of the antifraud provisions of Securities Act
Section 17(a); Exchange Act Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 thereunder, the
Commission must establish that the broker's unsuitable recommendation
was a misrepresentation (or material omission) made with scienter (i.e.,
with a mental state embracing intent to deceive, manipulate or defraud).
This statement appears inaccurate given the SEC's position in the disciplinary actions
cited in this footnote.
125 SEC STUDY REPORT, supra note 4, at 61.
126 See FINRA Regulatory Notice 11-25, Know Your Customer and Suitability 1-2
(May 2011), available at http://www.finra.org/web/groups/industry/@4ip/@4reg/@4notice
/documents/notices/pl 2 37 0 1 .pdf.
127 See FINRA Regulatory Notice 11-02, Know Your Customer and Suitability 2 (Jan.
2011), available at http://www.finra.org/web/groups/industriy/ aip/ areg/ a notice/docu
ments /notices/pl22778.pdf.
128 d.
129 See FINRA Regulatory Notice 12-25, Suitability, Additional Guidance on
FINRA's New Suitability Rule 1 (May 2012), available at http://www.finra.org/web
/groups/industry/@4ip/@4reg/a notice/documents/notices/pl26431.pdf.
FINRA R. 2090 (2012).
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and rules." 131 FINRA rules do not specify what particular information a
broker is required to obtain upon opening an account for a client, leaving
to each broker's judgment the determination of which facts are essential in
the varying circumstances of each new account.132
b. FINRA Rule 2111 (Suitability)
Rule 2111 requires a broker-dealer or an associated person to "have a
reasonable basis to believe that a recommended [security or investment]
strategy ... is suitable for the customer." 133 The Rule requires that the broker-
dealer or an associated person exercise reasonable diligence in obtaining the
requisite information about the customer's financial conditions, investment
experience, investment objectives, and risk tolerance.1 3 4
The term recommendation is not defined in the FINRA rules, but
FINRA has indicated that whether a recommendation has been made is an
objective inquiry of whether a communication reasonably would be viewed
as a suggestion that a customer take or refrain from taking an action. 135 The
SEC has indicated that any communication that is a "'call to action' and
'reasonably could influence' the customer to enter into a particular transaction
or engage in a particular trading strategy" is deemed a recommendation for
the purpose of suitability. 136 There is a directly proportionate relationship
between the amount communications are tailored toward particular customers
with regard to particular securities or strategies and the likelihood of a finding
the communication constitutes a recommendation. 137 In contrast, impersonal,
generalized statements about a security are not recommendations. 38 Like-
wise, "a broker-dealer's general solicitation.. .through the use or distribution
of marketing or offering materials ordinarily [does] not, by itself, constitute
a recommendation.... 9 Moreover, suitability obligations do not apply in
situations where a broker acts solely as an order-taker without solicitation
and provides only a trade execution service, 140 or where a potential client
does not act on the broker's recommendations.14 1
131 Id.
132 FINRA Regulatory Notice 11-02, supra note 127, at 6 n.5.
133 FINRA R. 2111 (2012).
134 d.
135 FINRA Regulatory Notice 11-02, supra note 127, at 3.
136 SEC STUDY REPORT, supra note 4, at 60 (citation omitted).
137 d.
138 Id. at 61 n.274.
139FINRA Regulatory Notice 12-25, supra note 129, at 5.
140 See NASD Notice to Members 01-23, Online Suitability 2-3 (Apr. 2001), available at
http://www.finmra.org/web/groups/industry/@4ip/@.reg/@notice/documents/notices/p003887.pdf.
141 See, FINRA Regulatory Notice 12-55, Suitability, Guidance on FINRA's Suitabil-
ity Rule 5 (Dec. 2012), available at http://www.finra.org/web/groups/industry/ a ip/ a reg
/@4notice/documents/notices/pl 9 7 4 3 5 .pdf.
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Rule 2111's suitability obligations have three components: reasonable-
basis suitability, quantitative suitability, and customer-specific suitability.142
Reasonable-basis suitability requires a member to have a "reasonable basis to
believe, based on reasonable diligence, that the recommendation is suitable
for at least some investors." 143 What constitutes reasonable diligence varies
from case-to-case, depending on, among other things, the complexity of and
risks associated with the security or strategy and the broker-dealer's familiar-
ity with the security or strategy.144 Quantitative suitability requires a broker-
dealer or associated person with "actual or de facto control over a customer
account to have a reasonable basis for believing that a series of recommended
transactions, even if suitable when viewed in isolation, are not excessive and
unsuitable for the customer when taken together in light of the customer's
investment profile... "145
There is no single test defining excessive activity as excessiveness can
only be determined based on the facts of each individual case; the determi-
nation of excessiveness may be based on a number of non-exhaustive fac-
tors including "turnover rate, cost-euity ratio, and the use of in-and-out
trading in a customer's account...."1 4 A broker-dealer or associated person
must "have a reasonable basis to believe that the recommendation is suitable
for a particular customer based on the customer's investment rofile," in-
vestment objectives, and risk tolerance, among other factors.1 7 FINRA's
suitability rule further provides explicitly that a recommendation must be
consistent with the reasonable expectation "that the customer has the finan-
cial ability to meet such a commitment." 148 Although the FINRA suitability
rule does not explicitly say brokers' recommendations must conform to the
best interest of their clients, which would be synonymous with a fiduciary's
standard of conduct, the FINRA Regulatory Notice 12-25 that interprets the
scope of the new suitability rule spells out the best-interest standard of care
for clients. 149 Some market professionals were surprised by this fiduciary-
like standard,1 50 but FINRA claims (rightfulM that such a standard has been
applied in case law and past interpretations.
142 FINRA R. 2111.05.
143FINRA R. 2111.05(a).
FINRA R. 2111.05(a).
145 FINRA R. 2111.05(c).
14 FINRA R. 2111.05(c).
117 FINRA R. 2111.05(b).
14 FINRA R. 2111.06.
19 FINRA Regulatory Notice 12-25, supra note 129, at 3.
15o See, e.g., Dan Jamieson, New Finra Suitability Rules Worry Industry, INVESTMENT
NEWS (July 5, 2012, 3:45 PM), http://www.investmentnews.com/article/20120705/FREE
/120709971.
151 FINRA Regulatory Notice 12-25, supra note 129, at 3.
[Vol. 5:055
FIDUCIARY DUTY OF BROKER-DEALERS
Based on FINRA Rule 2111(a), information pertinent to the investment
profile for each customer includes, without limitation, the "customer's age,
other investments, financial situation and needs, tax status, investment ob-
jectives, investment experience, investment time horizon, liquidity needs,
risk tolerance, and any other information the customer may disclose [to the
broker-dealer] in connection with [the latter's] recommendation." 15 2 FINRA
has refused to specify how the information collected should be used as the
appropriateness of the usage depends again on the facts and circumstances
of each case. 153 The flexibility built into the diligence process reflects com-
ments raised by the financial industry when FINRA first proposed the suit-
ability rule, that in some cases it may be unnecessary and indeed difficult to
solicit each and every piece of information listed in the rule.154
FINRA and NASD disciplinary actions have delineated a more refined
boundary for a broker-dealer's duty of reasonable diligence. Brokers have
been found in violation of suitability rules for neglecting to ask for the
client's financial condition or failing to review financial statements of the
company whose securities were recommended, even though the client was
wealthy and the investment amount was small. 15 5 Indeed, such failures have
been found to constitute recklessness for the purpose of meeting the scienter
requirement of securities-fraud claims. 156 Moreover, brokers are required
to exercise reasonable care when reviewing offering documents (such as
placement memoranda) of the securities recommended in order to identify
material misrepresentations or omissions of facts.157 The mere fact that the
recommended security has raving reviews and the client's current investment
is out of favor of the market does not justify the broker in making a sugges-
tion of switching without assessing whether the recommended security suits
the investor's own needs.1 58 In addition, a broker must first have a good
understanding of the risks associated with a security before recommending
152 FINRA R. 2111(a).
153 See Proposed Rule Change to Adopt FINRA Rules 2090 (Know Your Customer)
and 2111 (Suitability) in the Consolidated FINRA Rulebook, SR-FINRA-2010-039 (proposed
Jul. 30, 2010), at 37 [hereinafter FINRA Proposed Rule Consolidation (2010)], http://
www.finra.org/web/groups/industiy/ a ip/ a reg/ arulfil/documents/rulefilings/pl 2 18 3 5 .pdf.
151 Id. at 34.
155 FINRA v. Giannoleo, 2008 FINRA Discip. LEXIS 15, at * 12-13 (FINRA 2008).
156 Id. at *17.
157 See Kidder Peabody & Co., 46 S.E.C. 928, 930 (1977).
158 See NASD v. Fantetti, 2005 NASD Discip. LEXIS 57, at *28 (N.A.S.D. 2005)
(showing that Broker was disciplined for violating his suitability obligations because he
recommended that a client move investments from a bond fund, which was out of favor,
and move it to a stock fund, which received raving reviews, but was described as for people
to whom investment income was not essential).
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it to his clients. 15 For complex financial products, this understanding "should
be informed by an analysis of likely product performance in a wide range of
normal and extreme market actions." 160 A broker cannot rely only on the due
diligence conducted by his firm or the issuer of the security in fulfilling his
suitability obligations.161 A broker has a heightened duty to investigate the
accuracy audited financial statements if red flags have been raised about the
accuracy of the statements and is required to conduct independent investiga-
tions to ascertain the truth.1 62 These interpretations and disciplinary actions
suggest the scope of a broker-dealer's diligence is as broad as that of an in-
vestment adviser under the Investment Advisers Act. 163
As is the case of investment advisers, a broker-dealer is required to dis-
close material facts to his clients in order to ascertain the client's investment
objectives and risk tolerance.164 What constitutes a material fact varies by
the nature of the recommended securities, the scope of the relationship that
the broker has with the client, and the client's individual circumstances. 165
FINRA and NASD disciplinary actions and case law have shown that ma-
terial risks, better investment alternatives, and conflicts of interest are all ma-
terial facts that must be disclosed to clients.166 Note the similarity between
159 See FINRA v. Cody, 2010 FINRA Discip. LEXIS 8, at *25-26 (FINRA 2010)
(showing that Broker was disciplined for recommending asset-backed securities to a retail
customer without having a good understanding of the product himself).
160 See FINRA Regulatory Notice 12-03, Complex Products, Heightened Supervision
of Complex Products 5-6 (Jan. 2012), http://www.finra.org/web/groups/industry/@4ip
/@4reg/@4notice/documents/notices/pl25397.pdf.
161 NASD v. Faber, 2002 NASD Discip. LEXIS 23, at *41 (N.A.S.D. 2002) (noting
that testimony of broker's expert witness on the industry standard that brokers could rely on
firms' diligence was found inconsistent with years of established law).
162 NASD v. Kunz, 1999 NASD Discip. LEXIS 20, at *27-28 (N.A.S.D. 1999) (noting
that "red flags" were raised when the most important asset of the issuer was purchased a few
days before the auditor's certification of the financial statements, and there was a wide
disparity in the asset's estimated value as recorded in different corporate documents).
163 See discussion supra Part I.A.2.
164 See FINRA, Frequently Asked Questions: FINRA Rule 2111 (Suitability) at 12,
available at http://www.finra.org/web/idcplg?IdcService= GETFILE&dDocName=pl97
440&RevisionSelectionMethod=LatestReleased&Rendition primary&allowlnterrupt=1.
165 SEC STUDY REPORT, supra note 4, at 55.
166 See Faber, 2002 NASD Discip. LEXIS, at *50 (showing that Broker was disciplined
for failure to disclose the fact that the issuer of the recommended security had never been
profitable since inception). See also United States v. Laurienti, 611 F.3d 530 (9th Cir.
2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 969 (2011) (noting that Brokers had a duty to disclose a
conflict of interest arising from their receipt of special compensation for the securities they
recommended); Barthe v. Rizzo, 384 F. Supp. 1063 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); Shivangi v. Dean
Witter Reynolds, Inc., 107 F.R.D. 313 (S.D. Miss. 1985); FINRA v. Epstein, 2007
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the disclosure obligations of a broker-dealer and an investment adviser: the
former must disclose facts so as to permit an accurate assessment of the
client's investment objectives, preferences, and risk tolerance; the latter
must disclose facts that are relevant to the client's investment decisions,
which necessarily build on his investment objectives, preferences, and risk
tolerance.167 In addition, both broker-dealers and investment advisers must
disclose conflicts of interest. 168
Just as the SEC has applied a stringent standard in enforcing the obliga-
tions of investment advisers under the Investment Advisers Act, 169 FINRA
and its predecessor, NASD, have vigilantly pursued broker-dealers for vio-
lating suitability obligations. Scienter is not a prerequisite for finding a vio-
lation of the rules, as a broker-dealer may be subject to disciplinary actions
for having acted negligently in making any recommendation that is not suit-
able for the client.1 70 In addition, a broker-dealer is not exonerated from
liability for making an unsuitable recommendation even though he has ex-
plained the risks to the client. 171 Moreover, a broker-dealer's duty is not ex-
cused even if the client is wealthy, the investment amount is relatively small,
and the client could clearly afford to lose all of the investment.1 7 2 A broker
has the duty to refrain from making unsuitable recommendations even if the
client asks for a particular trade.173 A broker may be subject to disciplinary
actions for violating the suitability requirement even though the client is
highly sophisticated and actively participates in making trade decisions.17 1
FINRA Discip. LEXIS 18 (FINRA 2007) (showing that Broker was disciplined for failure
to discuss the option of switching into a comparable mutual fund which would have been
a free exchange and subject to lower expenses).
167 See discussion supra Part I.A.2.a.
168 See discussion supra Part I.A.2.a.
169 See discussion supra Part I.A.2.a.
170 See Norman S. Poser, Liability ofBroker-Dealers for Unsuitable Recommendations
to Institutional Investors, 2001 BYU L. REv. 1493, 1531 (2001).
171 See, e.g., NASD v. Kernweis, 2000 NASD Discip. LEXIS 49 (N.A.S.D. 2000).
172 See NASD v. Del Rey, 2007 NASD Discip. LEXIS 16, at *36-37 (N.A.S.D. 2007).
173 See NASD v. Howard, 2000 NASD Discip. LEXIS 16 (N.A.S.D.R. 2000) (disciplin-
ing a broker for recommending securities that were designated as "speculative" by his firm's
internal report to an 85-year old client, whom broker testified as someone who constantly
asked for "a piece of action").
174 See NASD v. Kernweis, 2000 NASD Discip. LEXIS 49 (N.A.S.D.R. 2000) (disci-
plining a broker for making unsuitable recommendations despite the fact that the client
spoke with the broker on a regular basis, approved each trade in his account, reviewed his
trade confirmations and account statements, and signed a letter acknowledging speculation
as his trade motivation, his awareness of the risk of substantial losses and high transaction
costs due to frequent trading).
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c. The Institutional Account Exemption
FINRA Rule 2111(b) exempts broker-dealers from their suitability ob-
ligations for institutional clients if certain conditions are met.1 5 FINRA
Rule 4512(c) defines an institutional account as the account of:
(1) a bank, savings and loan association, insurance company, or regis-
tered investment company;
(2) an investment adviser registered either with the SEC under section 203
of the Investment Advisers Act or with a state securities commission
(or any agency or office performing like functions); or
(3) any other person (whether a natural person, corporation, partnership,
trust, or otherwise) with total assets of at least $50 million.17
FINRA Rule 2111(b) provides that a broker is deemed to have ful-
filled his suitability obligation if:
(1) [he] has a reasonable basis to believe that an institutional customer
meeting the criteria discussed above is capable of evaluating investment
risks independently, both in general and with regard to particular transac-
tions and investment strategies involving a security or securities and (2) the
institutional customer affirmatively indicates that it is exercising indepen-
dent judgment in evaluating the [broker-dealer's] recommendations.1"
The conditions attach even in the situation where an agent, such as an invest-
ment adviser or the trust department of a bank, has been delegated decision-
making authority by an institutional customer."' A broker is still subject to
the suitability rules in recommending securities to an institutional client if
either of the two conditions are absent. Thus, suitability applies if it is appar-
ent to the broker that the institutional investor lacks a complete understanding
of the risks of the recommended securities (such as complex derivatives).
The affirmative-acknowledgement condition was added to the suitability
regulation when FINRA introduced Rule 2111.179 By acknowledging that it
is exercising independent judgment, the institutional investor raises an ob-
stacle to bringing a private right of action against the broker-dealer for
115 FINRA R. 2111(b).
17 FINRA R. 4125(c) (based on NASD Rule 3110(c)(4), which was adopted by FINRA
as Rule 4512(c) in December 2011); see also FINRA Regulatory Notice 11-19, Books
and Records, SEC Approves Consolidated FINRA Rules Governing Books and Records 2
(Apr. 2011), available at http://www.finra.org/web/groups/industiy/@4ip/@4reg/@4notice
/documents/notices/pl23548.pdf.
177 FINRA R. 2111(b) (emphasis added).
178Id.
179 See FINRA Proposed Rule Consolidation (2010), supra note 153, at 38.
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fraudulent misrepresentations about the suitability of the recommended secu-
rities, as reasonable reliance on the misrepresentation is a necessary element
of the claim.80
FINRA Rule 2111 is modeled after NASD Rule 2310 and interpretative
materials thereunder."' A NASD interpretative material published in 1996
lists non-exclusive guideline factors a broker can consider in assessing the
sophistication of his institutional clients with regard to the recommended
securities. 18 2 The factors include:
* [The customer's use of] consultants, investment advisers or bank trust
departments;
* the [customer's] general level of experience ... in financial markets and
specific experience with the type of instruments under consideration;
* the customer's ability to understand the economic features of the secu-
rity involved;
* the customer's ability to independently evaluate how market develop-
ments would affect the security; and
* the complexity of the security ... involved. 183
The presence or absence of any of the above factors is not dispositive;
rather the NASD intended the factors to serve as guidelines in the determi-
nation of suitability.1"' Suitability determination can only be made in light of
the specific context of each case, "taking into consideration all the facts and
circumstances of a particular member/customer relationship, assessed in the
context of a particular transaction.""' FINRA's disciplinary actions offer no
additional guidance on when "reasonable belief' is deemed to exist as there
have been few actions on the institutional account exemption altogether.
As discussed earlier, broker-dealers also have suitability obligations under
the anti-fraud provisions of the Securities Act and the Exchange Act. 186 Even
though FINRA rules exempt broker-dealers from suitability requirements
when dealing with qualified institutional clients, the anti-fraud provisions of
the federal securities law do not offer a similar exemption."' This raises the
question of whether a broker-dealer who is exempt from performing a suit-
ability analysis under FINRA's rules is nonetheless required to do so under
the anti-fraud provisions of the securities statutes. There is no explicit answer
180 See infra Part II.
181 See FINRA Regulatory Notice 11-02, supra note 127.
182 Nat'l Ass'n of Sec. Dealers, NASD Rule 2310-3, NASD MVANUAL (CCH) 4265 (2000).
183 Id. at 2.
184Id.
ssId.
186 See SEC STUDY REPORT, supra note 4, at 61 n.277.
187 See discussion supra Part I.B.1.
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to this question in the SEC's or FINRA's rules, explanatory guidance, or dis-
ciplinary actions, nor is the answer provided in court cases. The SEC holds
the view that a broker-dealer's recommendation per se "carries the implicit
representation that it was 'responsibly made on the basis of actual knowledge
and careful consideration.""" It follows, then, that a broker-dealer can be
found in violation of the anti-fraud statutes by simply making a recommen-
dation without carefully considering suitability, even if he qualifies for the
FINRA suitability exemption. However, this is unlikely the result intended
by the SEC given its approval of the FINRA suitability exemption rules.
The SEC has not disciplined any broker-dealer for his failure to perform a
suitability analysis (in absence of any affirmative misrepresentation with re-
gard to suitability) when the FINRA exemption applies.
C. Comparison of the Standard of Conduct of Investment Advisers and
Broker-Dealers
This section compares, based on discussions in previous sections, the
standard of conduct of investment advisers with that of broker-dealers under
the securities statutes. When broker-dealers are not exempt from FINRA's
suitability exemption, their standard of conduct in providing advice to clients,
whether retail or institutional, is comparable to that of investment advisers.
First, the anti-fraud provisions in the Investment Advisers Act (applicable to
investment advisers) and the Securities Act and the Exchange Act (both ap-
plicable to investment advisers as well as broker-dealers) all require disclo-
sures of material facts and conflicts of interest.189 Second, both broker-dealers
and investment advisers are subject to suitability obligations.190 Third, the
Investment Advisers Act requires investment advisers to act in the best in-
terest of clients in fulfilling their fiduciary duty, and FINRA has imposed a
similar obligation on broker-dealers through its interpretation of the scope of
the suitability requirement.191 Fourth, both investment advisers and broker-
dealers can be subject to liability for negligently as well as willfully violat-
ing the above obligations.192 Enforcement by the SEC and FINRA against
broker-dealers is no less stringent than that against investment advisers.193
188 See In re Wells Fargo Brokerage Servs., SEC Administrative Proceeding File No. 3-
14982, Securities Act of 1933 Release No. 9349, Securities Exchange Act of 1934 Release
No. 67649, Investment Company Act of 1940 Release No. 30167 (Aug. 14, 2012), at 9-10.
189 See discussion supra Parts I.A.2, I.B. 1.
190 See discussion supra Parts I.A.2.b, I.B.2.
191 See discussion supra Parts I.A.2, I.B.2.b.
192 See discussion supra Parts I.A. 1, I.B. 1.
193 See discussion supra Parts I.A.2.a, I.B.2.b.
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Broker-dealers may qualify for an exemption from FINRA's suitability
rules in dealing with institutional clients, but they must nonetheless comply
with the anti-fraud provisions of the securities statutes. Therefore, they must
still make full disclosure of material facts (including conflicts of interest) and
refrain from making material misrepresentations (including misrepresenta-
tions about the suitability of their recommendations). What is unclear in the
current regulation is whether they must still perform a suitability analysis in
order to fulfill their obligations under the securities statutes. This uncertainty
arises from the statutes' failure to provide an exemption from suitability com-
parable to the exemption included in FINRA's rules. However, the answer is
likely negative, as the SEC could not have intended a regulatory contradiction
to result from its approval of FINRA's exemption rules. That means broker-
dealers are relieved from the obligation to make suitability assessments for
institutional clients when FTNRA's exemption applies. In this narrow sense,
and under the restrictive conditions set by FINRA, broker-dealers are subject
to a standard of conduct lower than that of investment advisers.
II. ENFORCEMENT OF THE STANDARD OF CONDUCT OF
INVESTMENT ADVISERS AND BROKER-DEALERS
A. Identical Enforcement Channels and Elements of Claim
There is no palpable difference in the enforcement of the obligations of
investment advisers and broker-dealers, even though the former are labeled
fiduciaries while the latter are not. There are two channels through which
obligations of investment advisers and broker-dealers are enforced: discipli-
nary actions brought by regulatory agencies such as the SEC and (where
applicable) FIINRA, and private litigations by harmed investors in federal or
state courts. Actions by regulatory agencies can be brought for any violation
of the law or FINRA rules, irrespective of whether the violators owe any
fiduciary duty to their clients. Private rights of action, on the other hand, are
more restrictive.
Under section 215 of the Investment Advisers Act, an investor may
bring a private action against his investment adviser to seek a cancellation of
the advisory contract and/or a restitution of advisory fees paid for violations
of section 206 of that act.194 The statute's specific reference to "cancella-
tion of advisory contract" and "restitution of advisory fees" has prompted
the Supreme Court to conclude that Congress intended no private right of
action for damages and other monetary relief unless the adviser's conduct
19 Investment Advisers Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C.A. § 80b-15 (West 2013).
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constitutes fraud in violation of section 10(b) of the Exchange Act and SEC
Rule lOb-. 195 The investor must satisfy the pleading requirements for
Rule lOb-5 fraud claims in order to survive a motion to dismiss. 196
The same limitation applies to private actions against broker-dealers.
For violations of the anti-fraud provisions of section 17(a) of the Securities
Act, it has now been firmly established that only the SEC may bring an action
for injunctive relief or criminal liabilities; that is, investors have no private
right of action. 19 7 For violations of section 10(b) of the Exchange Act and
SEC Rule 10b-5, investors can bring private actions for monetary damages
if and only if the alleged misconduct is fraudulent as opposed to merely
negligent in nature.198 Courts generally hold the view that violations of rules
of a self-regulatory organization such as FINRA do not give rise to a private
right of action. 199
In order to succeed in a federal securities fraud claim against either an
investment adviser or a broker-dealer, an investor must establish that:
1. the defendant has made misrepresentations or omissions of material facts
in connection with the investor's purchase or sale of securities;
2. the defendant acted with scienter;
195 See Transamerica Mortg. Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 18-19, 33-34 (1979).
See also SEC STUDY REPORT, supra note 4, at 44-45 ("Advisory clients generally have no
private right of action for damages and other monetary relief against an investment adviser
under Advisers Act Section 206. Rather, advisory clients have only a limited private right
of action under Advisers Act Section 215 to void an investment adviser's contract and
obtain restitution of fees paid. Accordingly, clients cannot sue their adviser in federal court
for damages based on a violation of the Advisers Act. A client may privately enforce claims
against an investment adviser under the Exchange Act.... Rule lob-5 has been used suc-
cessfully by such clients in private actions regarding scalping, failure to disclose conflicts
of interest, misrepresentation and suitability violations." (citations omitted)).
196 See, e.g., Caroll v. Bear, Stearns & Co., 416 F. Supp. 998, 1001 (S.D.N.Y. 1976)
(quoting Abrahamson v. Fleschner, 392 F. Supp. 740, 750 (S.D.N.Y. 1975)) ("The word-
ing of this provision [of Section 206 of the Investment Advisers Act], making it unlawful
'to employ any device, scheme or artifice to defraud,' is identical to the language em-
ployed in R. lob-5. Consequently, the same pleading requirements with respect to partic-
ularity and scienter apply which requirements we have already found not to have been
met." (citation omitted)).
197 See SEC v. Tambone, 550 F.3d 106, 122 (1st Cir. 2008) ("[A]lthough private plain-
tiffs can maintain a cause of action under Rule lOb-5, only the SEC may bring a claim to
enforce the prohibitions of section 17(a).").
198 See SEC STUDY REPORT, supra note 4, at 45.
199 See Poser, supra note 170, at 1531 n. 150 ("The courts are divided on the question of
whether an SRO violation can give rise to an implied private right of action, but the
prevailing view on this question is negative."); see also Jablon v. Dean Witter & Co., 614
F.2d 677, 679 (9th Cir. 1980). But see Buttrey v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith,
Inc., 410 F.2d 135, 142 (7th Cir. 1969).
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3. the investor reasonably relied upon the misrepresentations or omissions;
and
2004. the investor suffered economic loss as a result of his reliance.
Pleading standards for securities fraud claims are set forth in Rule 9(b) of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the Private Securities Litigations
Reform Act (PSLRA) of 1995.201 Rule 9(b) provides that "[i]n alleging fraud
or mistake, a party must state with particularity the circumstances constitut-
ing fraud or mistake. Malice, intent, knowledge, and other conditions of a
person's mind may be alleged generally."20 2 PSLRA imposes a heightened
pleading standard to securities fraud claims under Rule 1Ob-5 such that the
plaintiff must: (1) "specify each statement alleged to have been misleading
and the reason or reasons why the statement is misleading"; 20 3 and (2) "state
with particularity facts giving rise to a strong inference that the defendant
acted with the required state of mind."204 The same pleading standard is ap-
plied to fraud cases against both an investment adviser and a broker-dealer.20 5
200 See In re IKON Office Solutions, Inc., 277 F.3d 658, 666 (3d Cir. 2002); see also
Investment Advisers Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C.A. § 80b-15 (West 2013). For examples of
fraud cases against investment advisers under section 206 of the Investment Advisers
Act, see Janus Capital Grp., Inc. v. First Derivative Traders, 131 S. Ct. 2296 (2011); Geman
v. SEC, 334 F.3d 1183 (10th Cir. 2003); Carroll v. Bear, Steams & Co., 416 F. Supp. 998
(S.D.N.Y. 1976). For examples of fraud cases against broker-dealers, see Michael S.
Rulle Family Dynasty Trust v. AGL Life Assurance Co., No. 10-231, 2010 WL 2721029
(E.D. Pa. July 7, 2010); Lapin v. Goldman Sachs Grp., Inc., 506 F. Supp. 2d 221
(S.D.N.Y. 2006).
201 15 U.S.C.A. § 78u-4.
202 FED. R. Civ. P. 9(b).
203 15 U.S.C.A. § 78u-4(b)(1).
204 Id. § 78u-4(b)(2).
205 For cases applying the standard to claims against broker-dealers, see, e.g., ABN
AMRO, Inc. v. Capital Int'l Ltd., 595 F. Supp. 2d 805 (N.D. Ill. 2008) (holding that the
state and common law fraud claims must meet the heightened pleading requirements of
Rule 9(b), and the federal securities fraud claims must meet the even higher pleading
requirements of the PSLRA); In re Interbank Funding Corp. Sec. Litig., 329 F. Supp. 2d
84, 88-89 (D.D.C. 2004) ("[W]here fraud is alleged, the circumstances constituting fraud
must be stated with particularity. FED. R. CIV. P. 9(b). The Private Litigation Reform Act
of 1995, 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4 ('PSLRA'), imposes additional pleading requirements on plain-
tiffs in securities cases."). For cases applying the same standard to fraud claims against in-
vestment advisers, see, e.g., Cascade Fund, LLLP v. Absolute Capital Mgmt. Holdings
Ltd., 707 F. Supp. 2d 1130 (D. Colo. 2010) (examining Cascade's allegations in their
entirety to determine whether they satisfy the PSLRA's pleading requirements); In re
Mutual Funds Inv. Litig., 384 F. Supp. 2d 845, 855 (D. Md. 2005) (noting that claims under
Rule lob-5 (a) and (c) of the Securities Exchange Act "are subject to the heightened
pleading requirements of Rule 9(b) and the PSLRA").
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B. Reasonable Reliance: An Impediment to Recovery
In order to establish a claim of fraud against a broker-dealer, the investor
must establish that he relied on the advice of the defendant and such reliance
was reasonable under the particular circumstances of the case.206 As dis-
cussed below, institutional investors face an almost insuperable challenge of
establishing reasonable reliance because they are deemed sophisticated in-
vestors and they typically are required to sign elaborate disclaimer provisions
which preclude reasonable reliance when transacting with broker-dealers.
1. A Multi-Factored Approach to Determining Reasonable Reliance
What constitutes reasonableness depends on the facts and circumstances
of each case, but the following factors have been highlighted as important
by courts in examining this issue: (1) whether the investor was sophisticated
with regard to the subject security and market; (2) whether the investor
had access to information necessary to evaluate the defendant's statements
and detect fraud; and (3) whether the parties had a long-standing or fidu-
ciary relationship.20 7
Courts have consistently found that well-capitalized business entities are
sophisticated investors in assessing the reasonableness of their reliance on
the alleged misrepresentations in securities fraud cases.208 This is so even if
the sophistication level appears marginal relative to the enormous complexity
206 See discussion supra Part II.A.
207 For cases in which courts enumerated relevant factors for consideration of reason-
able reliance, see, e.g., Banca Cremi, S.A. v. Alex. Brown & Sons, Inc., 132 F.3d 1017
(4th Cir. 1997); Jackvony v. RIHT Fin. Corp., 873 F.2d 411 (1st Cir. 1989).
208 See, e.g., MBIA Ins. Corp. v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc., 27 Misc.
3d 1233(A), at *1 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2010) (explaining how Merrill Lynch engaged in a CDS
with LaCrosse Financial Products, LLC (LaCrosse), in which Lacrosse sold credit protection
for the $5.7 billion CDOs held by Merrill Lynch. The CDS was further insured by MBIA,
a financial service firm that specialized in providing financial guarantee insurance. When
the mortgage market fell out, LaCrosse and MBIA brought a lawsuit alleging that "Merrill
Lynch made substantial fraudulent misrepresentations" with regard to the quality of the
CDOs' collaterals, their credit ratings and default rates. Id. The court held that the plaintiffs
failed to establish reasonable reliance and highlighted the fact that the transactions "were
the product of intensive negotiations among the parties, whose sophistication and business
acumen and experience cannot be overstated." Id. at *4); see also Harsco Corp. v. Segui,
91 F.3d 337, 344 (2d Cir. 1996) (holding that the plaintiff could not establish reasonable
reliance on the defendant's financial projections for purpose of its securities and common
law fraud claim as the plaintiff was sophisticated in business matters and had equal bar-
gaining power as the defendant, and transaction was a result of extensive negotiations and
due diligence by the plaintiff).
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of the subject security. For example, in Banca Cremi, S.A. v. Alex Brown
& Sons, Inc., the plaintiff was a Mexican bank that invested in collateralized
mortgage obligation (CMO) securities recommended by the defendant, a
US brokerage firm. 20 9 The brokerage firm's sales person initiated a cold call
to the bank, sent books and other educational materials about CMOs to the
bank's investment personnel, and introduced the bank to a renowned bond
market expert, although no formal consulting relationship was formed with
that expert.21 The bank started trading CMOs two months after the broker-
age firm's initial cold call; first made substantial profits; but ultimately in-
curred substantial loss when the CMO market collapsed in 1994.211 The
bank sued the brokerage firm for various causes, including the anti-fraud
provisions of the federal securities law for making unsuitable recommenda-
tions and misrepresentations about the riskiness and soundness of investing
in CMOs. 2 12 The bank's CMO team consisted of three key personnel, two of
whom held economics degrees and one of whom had a post-graduate degree
in international relations. 213 These individuals attended seminars, bought
treatises on the subject, and developed a 14-step review-approval process for
each CMO trade. 214 They were also provided some information about CMOs
when other investment banks approached them for CMO trades.215 The court
rejected the bank's argument that while it was a well-capitalized institu-
tional investor with expertise in general financial matters, it lacked specific
sophistication in CMO investments. 216 The court concluded that the plaintiff
acquired sophistication by attending seminars, purchasing treatises on the
subject, obtaining information from other investment banks, and trading
CMOs for a year.217 CMOs are highly complicated derivative instruments
with risks that often elude appreciation by even the most experienced players.
Indeed, multi-million dollar hedge funds that specialized in trading CMOs
and functioned as market makers were among the biggest losers in the 1994
CMO debacle.218 When the brokerage firm recommended a CMO, misrepre-
sented its riskiness, and then executed the first trades for the bank, the bank
could at most be described as having obtained a peripheral understanding of
209 Banca Cremi, 132 F.3d at 1021.
210 Id. at 1024-25.
21 1 Id. at 1024-26.
212 Id. at 1026-27.
213 Id. at 1024.
21 41 Id. at 1024-25.
215 Id. at 1025.
216 Id. at 1029.
217 Id.
218 See, e.g., Saul Hansell, Investment Funds Are Liquidated, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 1,
1994, at Dl.
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219this instrument through reading treatises and attending seminars. Although
the bank's subsequent trading in the CMO market strengthened its under-
standing, the trading was for a short duration and occurred mostly in a bull
market; it was no basis for finding the bank was sophisticated about the
risks of CMOs.220 However, limited exposures in a complex security can be
sufficient to portray an institutional investor as sophisticated in the eye of
a court.221
An investor is precluded from relying on the alleged misrepresentations
if he has access to information that, through his reasonable investigation,
would have revealed the truth.22 In this regard, courts have generally up-
held an investor's duty to investigate when the risk disclosures contained in
investment documents contradict the oral representations of the broker-dealer
recommending the investment. 223 The duty to investigate poses a dilemma for
an institutional investor in considering a broker-dealer's recommendation,
especially when the recommended security is complex and novel: can the
investor act upon a broker-dealer's statement that "this product is really
what you need," or should it try to learn about the security first before
investing? Prudence requires investigation, and hasty actions may well ne-
gate reasonable reliance. But investigation through self-education or seeking
third-party opinions may result in courts finding the investor has acquired
sophistication in the securities, as happened in Banca Cremi.224 This makes
it difficult for an institutional investor to establish reasonable reliance.
Courts have generally held the nature of the relationship (that is,
whether it is long-standing or fiduciary) between an investor and the person
who made misrepresentations is a relevant factor in determining whether the
investor's reliance on the misrepresentations was reasonable for purposes
219 Banca Cremi, 132 F.3d at 1029.
220 [d.
221 Id.
222 See, e.g., Brown v. E.F. Hutton Grp., Inc., 991 F.2d 1020, 1032-33 (2d Cir. 1993)
(holding that investors who purchased interests in an oil and gas limited partnership were
precluded from relying on brokers' oral assurance that the investment had low risk and
that the investment was suitable for investors' conservative objective because the offering
prospectus had extensive and glum disclosures of risk that were in prominent print and
spanned multiple pages); see also Hirschler v. GMD Invs. Ltd., No. 90-1289-N, 1991 WL
115773, at *6 (E.D. Va. 1991) (holding that the statute of limitation for a securities fraud
claim began when the investor received the private placement memorandum containing
risk disclosures that were inconsistent with oral representations of the broker, as the dis-
crepancy triggered a duty of inquiry on the part of the investor), aff'd, 972 F.2d 340 (4th
Cir. 1992). Although such an observation has been drawn mostly from cases involving
individual investors, courts' stance toward institutional investors can be readily imputed
from these cases as institutional investors are typically more sophisticated at detecting
fraud and fending for their own interests.
223 See Brown, 991 F.2d at 1032-33.
224 See discussion supra Part II.B. 1.
[Vol. 5:055
FIDUCIARY DUTY OF BROKER-DEALERS
of a securities fraud claim.2 It follows that imposing a fiduciary duty on
broker-dealers would make it easier for institutional investors to establish
reasonable reliance. However, as is evident from the case law discussed
immediately below, when dealing with broker-dealers, institutional investors
are typically required to sign elaborate disclaimer provisions that preclude
investors from claiming reasonable reliance. Fiduciary duty would not have
changed this outcome.
2. The Effect of Disclaimers
Before an institutional investor executes trades with a broker-dealer, the
investor is typically asked to sign lengthy waiver provisions that are de-
signed to insulate the broker-dealer from liability arising from potential suit-
ability violations. For example, in MBIA,226 the disclaimers contained in
numerous documents related to the transaction stated that:
* the investor was capable of assessing risk (either internally or through
independent advisers);
* the investor was capable of assessing the suitability of the transaction;
* the investor understood the terms, conditions, and risks of the transac-
tion and chose to assume the risk;
* the investor was to conduct independent diligence;
* the investor was not relying on statements by the broker other than those
specifically made in the written agreement;
* the investor acknowledged that the broker was "not acting as fiduciary or
[adviser] in connection with the [t]ransaction[j" and
* the signed document represented the entire agreement between the
parties.227
The question is whether by signing such disclaimers, an institutional
investor is precluded from claiming reasonable reliance on any misrepresen-
tation with regard to the suitability of the security.
a. The Anti-Waiver Provisions of Securities Statutes
The validity of this type of disclaimer should be examined in light of
the restrictions of section 14 of the Securities Act 2 28 and section 29(a) of the
225 See, e.g., Johnston v. CIGNA Corp., 916 P.2d 643, 646 (Colo. App. 1996); Banca
Cremi, 132 F.3d at 1038.
226 MBIA Ins. Corp. v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc., 27 Misc. 3d
1233(A) 3 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2010).
227 Id.
228 15 U.S.C.A. § 77n (West 2013) (providing that "[a]ny condition, stipulation, or pro-
vision binding any person acquiring any security to waive compliance with any provision
of this subchapter or of the rules and regulations of the Commission shall be void.").
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Exchange Act.229 These sections invalidate any contractual provision that
allows a party to waive compliance with provisions of the applicable secu-
rities statutes. This restriction reflects Congress's intent not to allow one
party to a securities contract to be able to induce the other party to opt out
of the securities law protection that the statute provides.230
In the context of the enforceability of a mandatory arbitration provision,
the Supreme Court has interpreted the anti-waiver provision of section 29(a)
as forbidding any waiver of compliance with the substantive obligations
imposed by the Exchange Act.231 The Court held, in considering the validity
of an agreement under this section, the disparity of the bargaining power of
the parties and the voluntariness of the agreement are irrelevant to the inquiry,
as the anti-waiver provision was "concerned[] not with whether brokers
'maneuver[ed customers] into' an agreement, but with whether the agree-
ment 'weaken[s] their ability to recover under the [Exchange] Act.,, 232
The Supreme Court has yet to rule on whether disclaimers such as those
stated at the beginning of this subsection are valid under the anti-waiver
statutes. Lower courts' decisions are inconsistent; some courts have specifi-
cally discussed the validity of such disclaimers in light of the anti-waiver
provisions, but others have not referenced those provisions in their opinions.
Courts that have considered the validity of disclaimers under the anti-
waiver statutes have held such disclaimers are not invalid per se, but rather
their validity should be determined based on the facts and circumstances of
each case.2 In this regard, courts have paid attention to the degree of detail
in broker-dealers' explicit representations and warranties, the specificity of
disclaimers, the length of negotiations, and the extent of diligence done by
the client-investor. Detailed contractual provisions and extended involvement
by the client-investor in negotiating the contract have prompted some courts
229 15 U.S.C.A. § 78cc(a) (providing that "[a]ny condition, stipulation, or provision
binding any person to waive compliance with any provision of this chapter or of any rule or
regulation thereunder, or of any rule of a self-regulatory organization, shall be void.").
230 See Robert Prentice, Contract-Based Defenses in Securities Fraud Litigation: A
Behavioral Analysis, 2003 U. ILL. L. REv. 337, 351 (2003) ("Congress was particularly con-
cerned with the plight of investors. As the Supreme Court noted in a case involving the
'33 Act's savings clause: [T]he Securities Act was drafted with an eye to the disadvantages
under which buyers labor. Issuers of and dealers in securities have better opportunities to
investigate and appraise the prospective earnings and business plans affecting securities
than buyers. It is therefore reasonable for Congress to put buyers of securities covered by
that Act on a different basis from other purchasers." (citation omitted)).
231 Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 228 (1987).
232 Id. at 230 (citation omitted).
233 See, e.g., Rogen v. Ilikon Corp., 361 F.2d 260, 265-67 (1st Cir. 1966) (holding that
the non-reliance provision in the parties' agreement was insufficient to find as a matter of
law that the plaintiff did not rely on the defendant corporation).
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to conclude the disclaimers represented the true intent of the parties and have
not prevented the client-investor from protecting his substantive rights.234
In some of these cases, a fiduciary relationship existed between the parties
but was not the focal point of the court's examination.235
b. The Validity ofDisclaimers without Reference to Anti-waiver
Provisions of the Securities Statutes
Courts have also examined the validity of disclaimers in securities
contracts without referencing the anti-waiver provisions of the securities
statutes. In some cases the client-investor seeks to establish his reliance on
the broker-dealer's alleged oral representations that are in addition to, but not
inconsistent with, specific representations in the parties' agreement as evi-
dence of "Additional Understanding." In other cases, the plaintiff seeks to
introduce evidence of "Contradictory Understanding," comprised of oral
representations that contradict specific representations in the agreement.
When the plaintiff seeks to introduce evidence of "Additional Under-
standing" but the parties' written agreement contains a merger clause to the
effect the written agreement represents the entire understanding and represen-
tations by the parties, and/or a no-reliance clause to the effect the plaintiff
is not relying on the defendant's representations, except for those made in the
written agreement, courts have applied a facts-and-circumstances approach
to determine whether the plaintiff could reasonably rely on the alleged oral
promises. This approach takes into account factors such as the plaintiff's so-
phistication and the extent of his participation in negotiating the contract.236
Courts have consistently found reasonable reliance lacking when the plain-
tiff is a business entity or an individual with solid business experience. In so
finding, courts have rejected the argument that the merger clause and the
no-reliance clause are boilerplate provisions in standard contracts.237 It is
234 See, e.g., Harsco Corp. v. Segui, 91 F.3d 337, 340, 345 (2d Cir. 1996) (holding that
the plaintiff could not fairly claim that disclaimers prevented it from protecting its sub-
stantive rights as the parties' agreement, which was a sixty-plus page, single-spaced
written document with a fourteen-page long section on specific representations and war-
ranties, was the result of months of negotiations and the plaintiff's extensive due diligence);
FS Photo, Inc. v. PictureVision, Inc., 61 F. Supp. 2d 473, 480-82 (E.D. Va. 1999) (finding
that a broad and sweeping disclaimer provision to the effect that the "[a]greement 'supersedes
any and all prior or contemporaneous agreements, representations and understandings be-
tween the parties,"' coupled with the lack of specific representations in the agreement
which might have prompted the plaintiffs to conduct due diligence on the defendants'
oral misrepresentations, constituted a violation of section 29(a) of the Exchange Act).
235 See, e.g., FSPhoto, 61 F. Supp. 2d at 484-85.
236 E.g., id. at 480.
237 See, e.g., Jackvony v. RIHT Fin. Corp., 873 F.2d 411, 415-17 (1st Cir. 1989) (holding
that the merger clause and the no-reliance clause in the parties' contract precluded the
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worth noting that a fiduciary relationship between the parties existed in some
cases but did not alter this outcome.238
When the plaintiff is a business entity and seeks to introduce evidence of
an oral "Contradictory Understanding" to contradict a specific written rep-
resentation, courts have consistently held the plaintiff s reliance on the oral
promise is unreasonable. A widely cited case on this point is Citibank v.
Plapinger, in which the guarantors of a loan refused to honor their guarantee
on the ground that it was induced by the creditors' oral promise of a credit
line to accompany the loan in question.239 The guarantee provision in the
loan agreement provided the guarantee was "absolute and unconditional ir-
respective of any lack of validity or enforceability of the guarantee, or any
other circumstance which might otherwise constitute a defense available to
guarantor in respect of the guarantee .... "240 The court pointed out the loan
agreement made a specific representation as opposed to a general exclusion
with regard to the unqualified nature of the guarantee, and held the defendant
could not realistically rely on an oral promise that directly contradicted the sub-
ject of a specific disclaimer in a written agreement signed by both parties.241
The holding in Citibank has been consistently followed by other courts
in litigation arising from securities transactions. A written disclaimer to the
effect the seller of a security makes no representation or warranty with re-
gard to the future value of the security precludes the buyer's reliance on any
242
oral representations otherwise. A written disclosure describing a security
plaintiff s reliance on the defendant's oral promise that it would operate the acquiree as an
independent entity either for five years or forever because the plaintiff was sophisticated
in business matters, participated in drafting the contract, and the alleged promise of inde-
pendence was vague); see also Rissman v. Rissman, 213 F.3d 381, 384-85 (7th Cir. 2000)
(refusing to enforce an oral promise because the contract contained a merger clause and a
no-reliance clause despite plaintiffs reliance argument in that he sold his shares to the
defendant at a lower price in light of the latter's oral promise that he would never take the
company public or sell it to another entity).
238 See Rissman, 213 F.3d at 388-89. Although the court in Rissman did not discuss
explicitly whether its decision would still hold if the parties had a fiduciary relationship, the
defendant indeed owed a fiduciary duty to the plaintiff as the defendant was a majority
shareholder and a director while the plaintiff was a minority shareholder and a salesman with-
out an active role in the management of the company. Id. at 382, 388-89. For a discussion
of Illinois law on this point, see generally Thomas J. Bamonte, Expanding the Fiduciary
Duties of Close Corporation Shareholders: The Dilemma Facing Illinois Corporate Law,
15 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 257 (1995).
239 Citibank, N.A. v. Plapinger, 485 N.E.2d 974, 975-76 (N.Y. 1985).
240 Id. at 974.
241 Id. at 976-77 ("[B]ut here we do not have the generalized boilerplate exclusion re-
ferred to by the commentators. Rather, following extended negotiations between sophisticated
business people, what has been hammered out is a multimillion dollar personal guarantee
proclaimed by defendants to be 'absolute and unconditional."').
242 See, e.g., Harsco Corp. v. Segui, 91 F.3d 337, 343 (2d Cir. 1996).
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as risky precludes an investor's reliance on a broker-dealer's oral statement
that the security is not risky.243 For claims alleging violations of suitability
rules, written disclaimers do not have to disclaim suitability per se in order
to preclude reasonable reliance by an investor on a broker's oral promise of
suitability. The investor is imputed with knowledge of risks clearly dis-
closed in written investment documents, and if the disclosures have painted a
gloomy risk profile for the security in the eyes of a reasonable investor, rea-
sonable reliance on a broker's oral representation cannot be established.244
The disclaimers cited at the beginning of this subsection are drawn from
245MBIA and are illustrative of the breadth of their coverage. That court
pointed to the fact that the disclaimers signed by the plaintiffs were specific
with regard to the plaintiffs' capability to assess the risk of the credit default
swap (CDS) contracts and the underlying collateral, and to the plaintiffs'
246undertaking of performing independent investigation. The court also noted
the CDS contract and guarantees were the product of intensive negotiations
247
among parties with a high level of sophistication and business acumen. In
light of these factors, the court, citing Citibank, held the plaintiffs should
not be allowed to disavow the responsibilities they committed themselves to
and "'condone [their] own fraud in deliberately misrepresenting [their] true
intention when putting their signatures to their absolute and unconditional
guarantee."' 248 The court's decision was affirmed on appeal, and the appel-
late court further concluded plaintiffs could not bring common law claims
for fraud in the inducement of contract, fraud by omission, or negligent mis-
representation, all of which require reasonable reliance on representations the
249
plaintiffs expressly stated they were not relying on.
Would a fiduciary relationship have altered the outcome of these cases?
In Carr, the court rejected the investor's claim that the fiduciary relationship
between him and the broker warranted his reliance on the broker's oral mis-
representation about the riskiness of the investment. 250 According to this
court, as long as the investor is a competent adult (let alone a sophisticated
and well-capitalized institution), and in the absence of "such a degree of trust
invited by and reasonably reposed in the fiduciary as to dispel any duty of
243 See Carr v. CIGNA Sec., Inc., 95 F.3d 544, 548 (7th Cir. 1996).
244 See Brown v. E.F. Hutton Grp., Inc., 991 F.2d 1020, 1029-32 (2d Cir. 1993).
245 MBIA Ins. Corp. v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc., 27 Misc. 3d
1233(A), at *3-4 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2010).
246 Id. at *3-4.
247 d.24 8 d. at *5 (quoting Citibank v. Plapinger, 485 N.E.2d 974, 977 (1985)) (citation omitted)
(internal quotations omitted).
249 MBIA Ins. Corp. v. Merrill Lynch, 81 A.D.3d 419, 419-20 (N.Y. App. Div. 2011).
250 Carr v. CIGNA Sec., Inc., 95 F.3d 544, 547-48 (7th Cir. 1996).
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self-protection by the principal[,]" the investor is bound by the clearly
251
written disclaimers he has signed. Is a sophisticated institutional investor
entitled to trust a fiduciary who presents it with elaborate disclaimers incon-
sistent with oral representations to such a degree as to "dispel any duty of
self-protection?" Likely not. Indeed, based on cases discussed earlier in this
section, investors are required to investigate in such a situation or else are
barred from claiming reasonable reliance.252
In sum, investors have only a limited recourse against a broker-dealer
or investment adviser through private lawsuits. The investor must show the
broker-dealer's conduct constituted fraud in violation of section 10(b) and
SEC Rule 1Ob-5. In order to establish a fraud claim, the investor must prove
he reasonably relied on misrepresentations of the defendant. This requirement
poses an almost insurmountable obstacle in lawsuits against broker-dealers
because they typically seek to shield themselves from potential liability by
requiring investors to sign elaborate provisions disclaiming investors' reliance
on the brokers' oral representations. Courts have been inclined to enforce
such disclaimers on the grounds that institutional investors are sophisticated
investors and therefore should be bound by what they sign. Fiduciary duty
is unlikely to alter this result.
C. Private Right ofAction under Common Law
Instead of bringing a private action under section 10(b) of the Exchange
Act and SEC Rule 10b-5, an investor can sue his broker-dealer (as well as in-
vestment adviser) in a state court under the common law doctrines of fraud-
ulent inducement of contract and negligent misrepresentation. The common
law claim, however, may be subject to preemption under Securities Litigation
Uniform Standards Act of 1998 (SLUSA) .253
251 Id. at 548 (emphasis added).
252 See discussion supra Part I.B. 1.
253 15 U.S.C.A. § 78bb (West 2013). SLUSA preempts many class actions based on mis-
representations or omissions made in connection with the purchase or sale of a nationally
traded security. SLUSA's preemption provision states that:
No covered class action based upon the statutory or common law of
any State or subdivision thereof may be maintained in any State or
Federal court by any private party alleging-(A) a misrepresentation or
omission of a material fact in connection with the purchase or sale of a
covered security; or (B) that the defendant used or employed any ma-
nipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in connection with the
purchase or sale of a covered security.
Id. § 78bb(f). Not all fraud claims involving securities that are brought under state law are
preempted by SLUSA. The preemption provision is limited to securities that are traded on a
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The fraudulent inducement of contract doctrine requires the investor to
establish in essence the same elements as a securities fraud claim, including
254reasonable reliance. A negligent misrepresentation claim typically requires
the plaintiff to establish elements as laid out in section 552 of the Restate-
ment (Second) of Torts:
* that the provider acted either "in the course of the [provider's] business,
profession or employment, or in any other transaction in which [the
provider] ha[d] a pecuniary interest" in the information supplied;
* that he "supplie[d] false information for the guidance of others in their
business transactions";
* that the recipient of the informationjustifiably relied on it;
* that the provider "fail[ed] to exercise reasonable care or competence in
obtaining or communicating the information"; and
* that this failure caused pecuniary loss to the plaintiff. 255
Since both fraudulent inducement of contract and negligent misrepresen-
tation claims require reasonable reliance on the part of the plaintiff,256 institu-
tional investors who have signed disclaimer provisions are similarly unlikely
to prevail on these common law claims as on a securities fraud claim.257
national exchange, applies only to class actions, and has carved out a number of exceptions
and exclusions. Id. § 78bb(f)(3)-(5).
254 See, e.g., Richmond Metro. Auth. v. McDevitt St. Bovis, Inc., 507 S.E.2d 344, 347
(Va. 1988); Micrel, Inc. v. TRW, Inc., 486 F.3d 866, 874 (6th Cir. 2007); Taylor Woodrow
Homes Fla., Inc. v. 4/46-A Corp., 850 So. 2d 536, 542 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003); Kaddo
v. King Serv. Inc., 250 A.D.2d 948, 949 (N.Y. App. Div. 1998); In re Allegheny Int'l, Inc.,
954 F.2d 167, 178 (3d Cir. 1992).
255 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552 (1977); see, e.g., Zurad v. Lehman Bros.
Kuhn Loeb, Inc., 757 F.2d 129, 134 (7th Cir. 1985) (finding that an omission by an invest-
ment firm concerning the recent market price and suspension of trading of the stock held by
the plaintiff, along with the provision of some faulty information, constituted a misrepre-
sentation of fact for the purpose of a negligent misrepresentation claim); Penrod v. Merrill
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 385 N.E.2d 376, 381-82 (Ill. App. Ct. 1979) (finding
that broker could be subject to liability for negligent misrepresentation for giving wrong
information about the window of tender offer opportunity for the stocks held by his client).
256 See Cont'l Leavitt Commc'ns, Ltd. v. PaineWebber, Inc., 857 F. Supp. 1266, 1272
(N.D. Ill. 1994) (stating that reasonable reliance is an element of a negligent misrepresenta-
tion claim); Henneberry v. Sumitomo Corp. of Am., 532 F. Supp. 2d 523, 538 (S.D.N.Y.
2007) ("Under New York law, a claim of negligent misrepresentation lies where (1) the de-
fendant had a duty, as a result of a special relationship, to give correct information; (2) the
defendant made a false representation that he or she should have known was incorrect;
(3) the information supplied in the representation was known by the defendant to be desired
by the plaintiff for a serious purpose; (4) the plaintiff intended to rely and act upon it; and
(5) the plaintiff reasonably relied on it to his or her detriment." (citations omitted)).
257 See Banca Cremi, S.A. v. Alex. Brown & Sons, Inc., 132 F.3d 1017, 1037-39 (4th
Cir. 1997) (stating that the same facts that preclude the finding of reasonable reliance for
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Reasonable reliance, however, is not an element of a common law fidu-
ciary breach claim, which requires merely showing that: reasonable reliance,
however, is not an element of a common law fiduciary breach claim, which
only requires showing that "there [] exist[s] a fiduciary relationship between
the plaintiff and defendant, the defendant [has] breached its fiduciary duty to
the plaintiff, and the defendant's breach [] result[ed] in injury to the plaintiff,
or benefit to the defendant." 258
It seems that imposing fiduciary duty on broker-dealers could at least
allow institutional investors to prevail on their fiduciary breach claims, irre-
spective of any disclaimer they have signed. However, it is unclear whether
an investor can bring an action for fiduciary breach arising from violations of
the securities statutes in light of the Supreme Court's decision in Trans-
259
america Mortgage Advisors. In that case, shareholders of a real estate
investment trust filed derivative and class action suits against the trustees of
the Mortgage Trust of America, claiming they were guilty of various frauds
and breaches of fiduciary duties in the course of advising or managing the
trust, causing the trust to purchase securities of inferior quality from a third
entity.260 The lawsuit was brought under section 206 of the Investment
Advisers Act and the common law doctrine of breach of fiduciary duty.261
The District Court for the Northern District of California ruled the Invest-
ment Advisers Act confers no private right of action for damages, includ-
ing parallel claims under the common law, and accordingly dismissed the
complaint.262 The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit re-
versed, holding the "implication of a private right of action for injunctive
relief and damages under the [Investment] Advisers Act in favor of appro-
priate plaintiffs is necessary to achieve the goals of Congress in enacting
the legislation."263 The Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed the
Ninth Circuit's decision on the ground that Congress did not intend for the
an SEC Rule 10b-5 claim also preclude the same finding for purposes of common law
fraud and negligent misrepresentation claims); Cont ' Leavitt Commc'ns, Ltd., 857 F. Supp.
at 1270-71 (exemplifying the general rule that, in a negligent misrepresentation claim, if an
accurate written material is provided, the plaintiff cannot rely on contradictory oral repre-
sentations unless the plaintiff lacks the information necessary to evaluate the representation
and the plaintiff has placed trust in the defendant).
258 Punts v. Wilson, 137 S.W.3d 889, 891 (Tex. App. 2004) (making no mention of rea-
sonable reliance as an element of the cause of action). See also Jones v. Blume, 196 S.W.3d
440, 447 (Tex. App. 2006).
259 Transamerica Mortg. Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11 (1979).
260 Id. at 13.
261 Id.
262 Id. at 14.
263 Lewis v. Transamerica Corp., 575 F.2d 237, 239 (9th Cir. 1978).
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fiduciary obligations of investment advisers under section 206 of the Invest-
ment Advisers Act to be enforced by private litigation.264
In light of Transamerica Mortgage Advisors and Congress's desire of
achieving regulatory parity for broker-dealers and investment advisers, there
is a substantial uncertainty whether investors can bring a private action
against broker-dealers for breach of a fiduciary duty. However, without
such a private right of action, and given institutional investors' narrow
chance of winning a fraud or negligence claim under the securities statutes
or the common law, extending a fiduciary duty to broker-dealers will likely
have little impact on investors' ability to enforce broker-dealers' obligations
through private litigations.
III. REGULATORY POLICY IMPLICATIONS
Based on discussions in the previous parts of this Article, it appears
that imposing a fiduciary duty on broker-dealers will have only a limited ef-
fect on institutional investor protection. Fiduciary duties comparable to that
borne by investment advisers entails a duty to disclose material facts (includ-
ing conflicts of interest), a duty not to subordinate the interests of clients to
the interests of the broker-dealers, and a duty to use reasonable diligence to
avoid making unsuitable recommendations. Such duties are already covered
in the existing securities statutes and FINRA's suitability rules, and broker-
dealers are held liable for violating them, either intentionally or negligently,
just as investment advisers are. The only scenario in which broker-dealers
probably face a reduced duty of care to an institutional client is when
FINRA's suitability exemption applies, in which case broker-dealers are re-
265lieved from performing a suitability analysis for the client. However, this
exemption applies only to qualified institutional investors who have sub-
stantial capital resources, only when broker-dealers reasonably believe that
the investors are capable of evaluating risks independently, and only if the
investors acknowledge in writing that they are exercising independent judg-
ment about the risks and merits of the investment rather than relying on the
broker-dealers' recommendations.266 The exemption requires that all three
conditions be satisfied to apply. Thus, the potential benefit of imposing a
fiduciary duty on broker-dealers extends only to a subset of institutional in-
vestors and only in limited situations. By exempting broker-dealers that have
met the above conditions, FINRA has manifested its belief that these institu-
tional investors in such situations do not need the protection of the suitability
264 Transamerica Mortg. Advisors, 444 U.S. at 22-25.
265 See discussion of regulatory ambiguity supra Part I.B.2.c.
266 See discussion of FINRA's exemption supra Part I.B.2.c.
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rule; the SEC, by approving the FINRA suitability exemption, has con-
curred in this belief. Proponents of a fiduciary duty for broker-dealers have
argued that institutional investors need this extra protection because they
often are not sophisticated in dealing with complex financial products.2 67 It
should be emphasized that the FINRA suitability exemption does not apply
automatically to transactions involving institutional investors: if broker-
dealers do not have a reasonable ground to believe that the investors are
indeed capable of assessing the risks of the security they recommend, the suit-
ability obligation remains with the broker-dealers. 26 8 In addition, even when
the FINRA exemption applies, broker-dealers are still subject to the anti-fraud
provisions of the securities statutes, which prohibit misrepresentations of ma-
terial facts pertinent to the recommended securities.269 For example, in the
Goldman Sachs case,270 Goldman Sachs's failure to disclose its conflict of in-
terest was found by the SEC to constitute a violation of the anti-fraud statutes,
even though Goldman Sachs might be able to benefit from the FINRA suit-
ability exemption given that the investors in the CDOs were institutions
with substantial experience in structured finance products.
If fiduciary duty is indeed imposed on broker-dealers, Congress and the
SEC must also address the question of whether institutional investors can
waive broker-dealers' duties by contract. There are situations in which it is
mutually beneficial for the parties to sign a waiver, such as when the institu-
tional investor is truly sophisticated and desires to waive the broker's suitabil-
ity assessment in exchange for a lower brokerage fee. Can the broker-dealer's
suitability obligation, imposed as a part of his fiduciary duties, be waived in
such a situation? The common law allows contractual modifications of the
duties of a fiduciary, and the SEC has opined that modification of an in-
vestment adviser's liabilities through a hedge clause is not a per se violation of
section 206 of the Investment Advisers Act.272 To disallow a waiver creates
267 See, e.g., 156 CONG. REc. S3104, SA 3792 (daily ed. May 4, 2010) (proposal of
Sen. Barbara Boxer).
268 See discussion supra Part I.B.2.c.
269 See discussion of continued application of the anti-fraud provisions to broker-dealers
who are subject to FINRA's exemption supra Part I.B.2.c.
270 See discussion supra Introduction and note 15.
27 1See Tamar Frankel, Fiduciary Duties as Default Rules, 74 OR. L. REv. 1209, 1213-
14 (1995) (discussing conditions under which modifications of fiduciary duties have been
upheld by courts).
272 A "hedge clause" typically is used in an investment advisory contract to absolve the
adviser from liability except for gross negligence, reckless or willful conduct and is typically
followed immediately by a non-waiver clause which invalidates waiver of any rights that are
non-waivable under applicable law. See Heitman Capital Mgmt., LLC, SEC No-Action
Letter, 2007 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 159, at *25-28, *30-31 (Feb. 12, 2007) (citing In re William
Lee Parks, Investment Advisers Act Release No. 736 (Oct. 27, 1980) and In re Olympian Fin
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inconsistencies in the law and is also against the spirit of free contract, but to
uphold a waiver would put the parties in exactly the same position as they are
under the current regulatory regime with the FINRA exemption. Fiduciary
duty has created an illusion of institutional investor protection, but it really
is much ado about nothing.
A more viable approach to enhancing institutional investor protection
is broadening the scope of private rights of action and abandoning a strict
contractarian approach to determining the validity of disclaimer provisions
signed by investors. The current limitation of private rights of action to fraud
cases, the ensuing requirement of "reasonable reliance," and elaborate
boilerplate disclaimers inserted in investment contracts effectively deprive
institutional investors of opportunities to recover damages through private
litigation. Investors must rely on enforcement actions brought by the SEC
or FINRA. SEC officials have openly acknowledged that constraints in the
agency's budget and statutory power have prevented the agency from reach-
273ing the optimal level of enforcement, and the SEC has been an ardent
advocate for a broader scope of private rights of action as a way of supple-
menting its enforcement efforts. 27 Imposing fiduciary duty without simul-
taneously making private rights of action more accessible to investors brings
Servs., Inc., Investment Advisers Act Release No. 659 (Jan. 16, 1979)) (advising that a hedge
clause only violates section 206(1) and 206(2) of the Investment Advisers Act if it is likely to
lead an investment advisory client to believe that he or she has waived non-waivable
rights of action against the investment adviser under federal or state law, and that, in this
regard, the validity of the hedge clause depends on facts and circumstances of each case,
including the advisory client's sophistication).
273 See Elisse B. Walter, Comm'r, U.S. Sec & Exch. Comm'n, Remarks Before the
FINRA Institute at Wharton Certified Regulatory and Compliance Professional (CRCP)
Program *2-3 (Nov. 8, 2011), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/201 1/spch
11081 lebw.htm#P8_192 ("In its amicus brief in Borak, for example, the Commission argued
that 'limitations of manpower present [sic] the Commission from bringing enforcement
actions for all violations' .... What I mean is that by limiting implied private rights through
strict statutory interpretation, the Court has also potentially limited the express public rights
of action contained in the statute.... Aside from budgetary constraints, there are also limi-
tations on the Commission's authority. For example, it cannot seek damages for violations
of the federal securities laws, although it can require wrongdoers to disgorge their 'ill-
gotten gains.' Thus, while the agency can require wrongdoers to give up the benefits they
have received from violations, it cannot necessarily make the victims whole.").
274 See, e.g., Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 3, Janus Capital Grp., Inc.
v. First Derivative Traders, 131 S. Ct. 2296 (2011); Brief for the Securities and Exchange
Commission as Amicus Curiae at 2, Capital Mgmt. Select Fund Ltd. v. Bennett, 680 F.3d
214 (2d Cir. 2012) ("Although the district court's holding regarding standing does not
affect the Commission's ability to bring enforcement actions for the conduct alleged here,
private actions are an 'essential element' to Commission enforcement actions."); see also
David S. Ruder, The Development of Legal Doctrine Through Amicus Participation: The
SEC Experience, 6 Wis. L. REv. 1167, 1170 (1989).
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little improvement upon the current state in which only a limited number of
violations are sanctioned and investors are often unable to recover the full ex-
tent of their damages. However, the Supreme Court has taken an alarmin Iy
restrictive stance toward private rights of action in a series of recent cases.
Dodd-Frank mandated that the SEC conduct a study about the cross-border
276
scope of private rights of action under section 10(b) of the Exchange Act.
The time has also arrived for a study on broadening the domestic scope of
private rights of action beyond the current restriction to fraud cases. In ad-
dition, it has long been argued in legal scholarship that courts should
abandon a strict contractual approach toward disclaimer provisions in
securities transactions, as institutions function through their individual
investment officers who are just as prone to behavioral irrationality as are
277individual investors. Courts have given scant attention to such pleas as
275 See Stoneridge Inv. Partners v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 552 U.S. 148, 166-67 (2008)
(holding that investors do not have a right of private action against third parties who only
aided and abetted without having a direct fiduciary duty or making direct misrepresenta-
tions to investors because the investors' reliance is too remote); Janus Capital Grp., 131
S. Ct. at 2304 (finding that false statements in a mutual fund's prospectus were made by
the fund itself and not the fund's investment adviser and parent company even though the
parent company prepared the prospectus and marketed it on behalf of the fund; also arguing
that the court must give narrow dimensions to rights of action under the anti-fraud provisions
of the securities statutes); Morrison v. Nat'l Austl. Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2881,
2888 (2010) (arguing that because the Exchange Act is silent on the extraterritorial reach of
section 10b the court must presume that Congress intended to limit its application to secu-
rities transactions occurring within the United States; also holding, as a result, that pur-
chasers of shares of a company listed on a foreign exchange do not have a right of action
against the company under section 10b even though the company allegedly defrauded
investors about the value of an asset acquired in the U.S.).
276 Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 929Y, H.R. 4173, 110th Cong. (2010). To
respond to Dodd-Frank's mandate, the SEC produced a report of the study in April 2012
in which it advanced a few options that Congress could consider in formulating the law in
this regard. See U.S. SEC. & ExCH. COMM'N, STUDY ON THE CROSS-BORDER SCOPE OF THE
PRIVATE RIGHT OF ACTION UNDER SECTION 10(B) OF THE SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF
1934 vi-vii (2012), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/2012/929y-study-cross
-border-private-rights.pdf.
277 See Prentice, supra note 230, at 358-77. Prentice discusses the nine reasons why, from
the viewpoint of behavioral science, people do not read the contracts they sign: (1) lack of
time or energy to comprehend all contractual provisions, (2) overconfidence, over-optimism
and lack of skills at calculating probabilities, (3) naively positive perceptions of other people,
(4) inability to detect deception, (5) inability to discard information even when the source of
information is found to be questionable, (6) tendency to be influenced more by personal
encounters than fine-print disclaimers, (7) reluctance to alter a written contract because it em-
bodies the status quo of a bargaining result, (8) the "social proof' mentality towards boiler-
plate disclaimers, i.e., there are a lot of people like me investing in stock and they all signed
this contract, too, and (9) a tendency to accept pre-printed contracts as the norm and any
changes thereto as an abnormal situation. Id.
FIDUCIARY DUTY OF BROKER-DEALERS
evidenced by their consistent denial of recovery by institutional investors
on the basis of written disclaimers. 278 In this regard, FTNRA's suitability-
exemption rule represents a positive step toward the right direction, as it
builds on not only written disclaimers of an institutional investor but also a
reasonableness test that gives effect to such disclaimers only if broker-
dealers reasonably believe they reflect the true capability of the institu-
tional investor.
CONCLUSION
The losses suffered by investors during the 2008 financial crisis and the
publicity of abusive practices by broker-dealers toward their clients prompted
Congress to inquire about the feasibility of imposing a fiduciary duty on
broker-dealers so as to enhance investor protection and eliminate the per-
ceived disparity between the standard of conduct of broker-dealers and that
of investment advisors. The scope of this inquiry covered broker-dealers'
dealings with both retail investors and institutional investors, such as cor-
porations, investment funds, organizations, and government entities. The in-
stitutional investor part of the inquiry turned out to be highly controversial,
with both supporting and opposing voices raised from financial market
professionals. Arguments have centered on whether institutional investors
need a higher level of protection given the depth of their sophistication and
the abundance of their capital resources.
This Article shows that the focal point of this debate should not be
whether institutional investors in general need a higher level of protection,
but rather whether the subset of institutional investors that are well-
capitalized, capable of evaluating risks, and willing to sign a written dis-
claimer that they are not relying on broker-dealers' advice need a higher
level of protection. This is because broker-dealers' standard of conduct
under the current regulation is lower than that of investment advisers (who
are fiduciary) only with regard to this subset of institutional investors. Once
our inquiry focuses on this subset of investors, the potential benefit of a
broker-dealer fiduciary duty appears quite limited. This paper also shows that
fiduciary duty is predictably impotent in enforcing broker-dealers' standard
of care through private litigations because it cannot, based on existing case
law, override the effect of elaborate disclaimers that bar investors' claims of
reasonable reliance on broker-dealers' advice. As for enforcement actions
brought by the SEC or FINRA, fiduciary duty is not a necessary element of
the cause of action under the existing regulation, and the agencies can pursue
278 See discussion supra Part II.B.2.
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violators of law even if they are not fiduciary. The benefits of fiduciary duty
are impalpable.
Financial market professionals have voiced concerns that the imprecise
boundaries of fiduciary duty and the fear that its overbroad application may
have a chilling effect on beneficial economic activities. 279 Hopefully, the re-
sults of this Article help Congress and the SEC balance the pros and cons
of the fiduciary duty initiative and reach a sensible conclusion about the
advisability of its implementation in the financial market.
279 See Larry E. Ribstein, Fiduciary Duties ofInvestment Bankers: Senate Testimony-
May 4, 2010 6-8 (U. Ill. L. & Econ. Research Paper No. LE10-019), available at http://
ssm.com/abstract=1661285.
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